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H – 1154

International Court of Justice

Exhibit U.S.A. 123
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO. 2450-PS.
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER

Munich Edition, Wednesday 26 March 1941, No. 85, Volume 54.

Muenchener Ausgabe, Mittwoch 26 Maerz 1941. 85, Ausg. 54.

(Page 1, heading)

"Yugoslavia also in the Tri-Partite Pact
Mister Churchill again has lost a battle"

X X X X X X X X

(Page 2, Heading in centre of page)

"The Protocol on the Entry of Yugoslavia."

X X X X X X X X

(Page 2. Column 2. Line 42 to Line 60)

"Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.

At the same time, when the protocol on the entry of Yugoslavia to the Tri-Partite Pact was signed, the governments of the Axis powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the following identical notes :

'Mr. Prime Minister :

'In the name of the German Government and at its behest, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of the following :

'On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry to-day into the Tri-Partite Pact, the German Government confirms its determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.'

X X X X X X X X

(Page 2, Column 2. Lines 64 to 83)

'Mr. Prime Minister :

'With reference to the conversations, that occurred in connection with the Yugoslavian entry into the Tri-Partite Pact, I have the honour to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in the name of the Reich Cabinet (Reichsregierung), that in the agreement between the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugoslavian Government, the governments of the Axis powers during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through Yugoslavian national territory.

H1154 - 0002

H1154 - 0003

Permit me, Mr. Prime Minister, to express the assurance of my highest respects.' "

SGD. JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
NO. 2450-PS.

19 November 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt., (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation f Document No. 2450-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKID ORE
Lt. (jg) USNR, 391590.

1160

Exhibit GB 124
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

H1154-0004

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2765-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Page 1
entire first paragraph

The Fuehrer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's joining the tripartite pact and the resulting definition of her position. This is of special importance in view of the proposed military action against Greece, for, if one considers that for 350 to 400 km the important line of communication through Bulgaria runs within 20 km. of the Yugoslav border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugoslavia an undertaking against Greece would have been militarily an extremely fool hardy venture.

Page 4
last Paragraph on page 4 - ending on page 5.

Toward the end of March, Germany would have completed her assembly of troops on the Greek front. Then it would only await good weather, for in rainy weather three of her most important arms cannot be utilized:

1.) The air force, especially in mountainous territory

2.) The heavy technical arms which cannot move on the soft ground, and

3.) The rapidity with which, in a breakthrough of the front, the armored and motorized formations have to follow through. Therefore, beginning the end of the Month, Germany would only be awaiting good weather in order to strike.

Page 9
first Paragraph
starting on that page

In answer to a question of Ciano's about the probable duration of the Greek campaign, the Fuehrer replied that given favourable weather the decision could be brought about within a few days. Nevertheless the initial assembly (Aufmarsch) presents great technical and organizational problems. More than 1 ½ million men would have to be supplied, and each additional division brought to Bulgaria would again delay for a few days the supplies of the other ones, because only a few railroads are available.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 2765-PS

12, November 1945

I, Virginia von SCHON, 046318, hereby certify that I am

H1154 - 0005

thoroughly conversant with the English and German language; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2765-PS.

Virginia von SCHON
046318

H1154 - 0006

Exhibit G.B. 125
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

(SEC-24.7/C 127)

EXTRACT FROM "DIRECTION NO. 25."

Führer's Headquarters.

27. 3. 41.

(1) The military Putsch in Jugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Jugoslavia must, in spite of her protestations of loyalty for the time being, be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.

(2) It is my intention to force my way into Jugoslavia from the area comprising Fiume and Graz on the one hand and the area around Sofia on the other, moving in the general direction of Belgrade and South of this, and to contact and annihilate the Jugoslavia army, also to cut off the extreme Southern part of Jugoslavia from the rest of the country, and to take it over as a base for the continuance of the combined German and Italian offensive against Greece.

The approaching opening of the Danube to traffic, and the taking over of the copper mines at Bor are important for reasons of war economy.

An attempt will be made to persuade Hungary and Bulgaria to take part in the operations by holding out the prospect of regaining Banat and Macedonia.

The political internal crisis in Jugoslavia will be rendered more acute by the political assurances given to the Croatians."

....

A. HITLER.

Exhibit U.S.A. 120
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

Partial translation of DOCUMENT 1746 PS. OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF of COUNSEL.

CONFERENCE BETWEEN FIELD MARSHAL LIST and representatives of the BULGARIAN GENERAL STAFF.

(Agreement between GERMANY, BULGARIA, and RUMANIA for attacking GREECE and eventually TURKEY) dated 8th FEBRUARY 1941.

---oOo---

PART I
(partial translation)

Page 1, Line 5-14.

MINUTES.

of questions discussed between the representatives of the Royal Bulgarian Gener Staff and the German Supreme Command - General Field Marshal List - in connecti with the possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria and their commitme against Greece and possibly against Turkey, if she should involve herself in th war.

Page 1, Line 19 - Page 2, Line 24:

1) During the operations of the German troops against Greece or Turkey, the Bulgarian army will not be committed in an offensive way against the two mentioned countries, according to an agreement between the two governments. It will be reinforced, in order to safeguard the new order on the Balkan.

2) Up to the arrival of German troops on the Bulgarian South and South east border, the Bulgarian army will alone defend its territory with its own troo for the beginning, with about the following deployment:

at least 6 Bulgarian divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border, sufficient forces for the protection of the border, on the Greek border reinforced border protection on the Yugoslavian border.

Later on, the Bulgarian army is also responsible for adequate protection along those fronts where German forces will not become offensive.

The mobilisation and the deployment of these forces may start immediatel in a camouflaged way. However, in order that these measures will have the desired effect, the deliveries to Bulgaria must be fulfilled immediately by Germany (enclosure I).

The German supreme command will do everything in its power, so that its troops will appear on the Bulgarian-Turkish and Bulgarian-Greek border in sufficient numbers in the shortest time.

For this purpose, from the beginning a sufficient amount of German force mainly armored and motorised divisions - will be moved in the shortest time behind the Bulgarian border protection troops. This move will start with the deployment of the two armored divisions which already are in the Dobrudscha as well as with the armored and motorised divisions which are in Walachia. The other forces provided for the operations, that means more infantry and armored divisions, will follow behind, depending on weather, road, and bridge situation

Page 3, Line 3 - 12:

3) The Bulgarian and the German general staff will take all measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the operations and to assure in this way the most favourable conditions for the execution of the German operations as planned

The representatives of the two general staffs consider it to be suitable inform their governments that it will be good to take the necessity of secrecy and surprise into consideration, when the three-power treaty is signed by Bulgar in order to assure the success of the military operations.

H1154-0007

PAGE 3, LINE 13 - PAGE 4, LINE 27:

4). In order to protect Bulgaria from any possible enemy before and after the beginning of the operations, the German supreme command will take the following measures:

a) Against Turkey:

From the beginning, sufficient German forces, mainly armored divisions, will be thrown against the Turkish border behind the Bulgarian defensive front. At the same time, the German air force will stand ready for active defense.
If Turkey should attack Bulgaria, while the German operations against Greece are being carried out, the Bulgarian army will defend itself, supported by sufficient German forces. The German supreme command will take all necessary measures immediately, in order to beat and throw back the Turkish army with German troops, so that an extended defense by Bulgarian troops will be avoided on the Turkish front.
The same also goes for Greece, if the Greeks should attack Bulgaria during the German operations against Turkey.

b) Against Greece:

Motorized advance units shall thrust immediately against the Greek-Bulgarian border as fast as possible, in order to stand there as support for the protection of the Bulgarian border.

c) Against Yugoslavia:

If Yugoslavia should attack, the columns of the German infantry division would take over the protection against the West, at first, which are deployed on the right flank to the rear. Other German forces would get at Yugoslavia from another side, too. It is assumed in this case, that a reinforced Bulgarian border protection exists also along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border.

d) Against Russia:

Sufficient German forces are ready on the German Eastern border, to be used for any purpose. Moreover, German instructor troops are available in Rumania, in addition to the Rumanian army.

e) Against landing attempts:

The German troops are in a position to take a hand at any time in the defense against a possible landing on the Black Sea coast, in cooperation with the air force. Besides, the supreme command of the army List will make its suggestions at the competent German navy office, in order to strengthen the protection of the two ports Varna and Burgas, according to the already known wishes of the Bulgarian supreme command.

The Bulgarian army will also do its part to guarantee the protection of the two ports by providing forces there.

PAGE 4, LINE 32 - PAGE 5, LINE 27:

6). The supply of the German troops on their march through Bulgaria and during their operations against Greece or Turkey will be provided from the own German stocks. However, in order to relieve the railroad and transportation system, especially with regard to feeding facilities, assistance from the Bulgarian side is necessary. This assistance will only be within the limits of the so-called "Contingents". ("Kontingent"). The details about the installation of the necessary dumps, about purchases, payment of work, etc., as well as export and import control, will be regulated by a special commission.

(Remark in pencil) (L IV Is taken care of)

H1154-0008

7). It will be necessary to use the Bulgarian national installations (railroad, postal system, etc), for the purposes of the German armed forces, as far as it will be bearable for the Bulgarian economy. The details about it will be regulated by the special commissions which are already in Sofia. It is presumed that especially the railroad net and the rolling stock will be placed at the disposal of the German army for its requirements. For that purpose it is necessary that the Bulgarian railroad receives an extra allowance of about 100 locomotives, 1500 freight cars and 30 km rail material, in order to satisfy all requirements of the Bulgarian army, the Bulgarian economy and the German army. Operation and management of the Bulgarian national railroads, postal and telegraphic service are to remain in Bulgarian hands. Transportation required by the German army will be organized by the Bulgarian general staff. The details about the service of the railroads, postal and telegraphic systems will be discussed and regulated by a special commission.

PAGE 6, LINE 6 - 11:

10). The activity of the counter intelligence service (Abwehr dienst) of the German and Bulgarian general staffs is already regulated by a special commission.

11). The question of command function in Bulgaria could not yet be finally settled. The German high command will come back to this question in the near future.

PAGE 6, LINE 15 - 26:

13). Questions which might come up later will be taken care of by further conferences.

14). The conditions laid down above, as far as political questions are concerned, will be in effect only after the approval by the German supreme command of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the preparations for the execution of the operations will be made with all energy, regardless of the above fact.

In order to enable the Bulgarians to carry out in time the last preparations for the deployment, it is necessary that the Bulgarian general staff should be informed of the crossing of the border by the Germans 10 days ahead of time.

Finis

PART II
(partial translation)

Conference of Hitler and the German High Command
on the situation in Yugoslavia. Dated March 27, 1941

PAGE 1 - PAGE 4, LINE 13:

W F St

Berlin, March 27, 1941

Top Secret

1st copy W F St
2nd copy L
3rd copy W Kr G

Only for general officers

To be transmitted by officers only.

Discussion about the situation in Yugoslavia

Present:
Führer
Reich Marshal
Chief OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces)
Chief W F St
Major General Bodenschatz
Colonel Schmundt

(stamp)
'OKW/W F St'
'Dept L (I M I)'
'29 March 1941'
'No 44391/41 top secret'
(illegible)

(several pencil marks and initials)

H1154 - 0009

Present: (cont'd)

Commander von Puttkamer
Lieutenant-Colonel Scherff
Major von Below
Major Christian
Later on the following persons were added:
Supreme commander of the army (Ob.d.H,)
Chief of the General staff of the army (Chef Gen St d H)
Colonel Hensinger
Lieutenant-Colonel Sieverth
Reich Foreign Minister
Ambassador Hewel
Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Walden
Colonel Schmidt
Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Rintelen.

BDC-OKW-1631
(remark in pencil at right lower corner of first page)

The Führer

describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup d'etat. Statement that Yugoslav was an uncertain factor in regard to the coming Marita-action and even more in r gard to the Barbarossa-undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never pro-German. These governments never sit securely in the saddle, because of the nationality problem and the officers caste (Kamarilla), which is always inclined to start a coup d'etat. In the present time, the country had only one strong ma namely Stojoldinowitsch, and Regent Prince (Prinzregent) Paul had him thrown ov to his own disadvantage.

The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for us t ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country's attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the government would have happened during the Barbarossa-action, the consequences for us probably would have been considerably more serious.

The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav government which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready.

It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary and in certain respects of Bulgaria too. Roumania's main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day, a message will still be addressed to the Duce.

Politically, it is especially important that the blow against Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the military destruction is done in a lightning like undertaking. In this way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised to these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.

This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the short time.

H1154-0010

PAGE 3, LINE 13 - PAGE 4, LINE 27:

4). In order to protect Bulgaria from any possible enemy before and after the beginning of the operations, the German supreme command will take the following measures:

a) Against Turkey:

From the beginning, sufficient German forces, mainly armored divisions, will be thrown against the Turkish border behind the Bulgarian defensive front. At the same time, the German air force will stand ready for active defense.
If Turkey should attack Bulgaria, while the German operations against Greece are being carried out, the Bulgarian army will defend itself, supported by sufficient German forces. The German supreme command will take all necessary measures immediately, in order to beat and throw back the Turkish army with German troops, so that an extended defense by Bulgarian troops will be avoided on the Turkish front.
The same also goes for Greece, if the Greeks should attack Bulgaria during the German operations against Turkey.

b) Against Greece:

Motorized advance units shall thrust immediately against the Greek-Bulgarian border as fast as possible, in order to stand there as support for the protection of the Bulgarian border.

c) Against Yugoslavia:

If Yugoslavia should attack, the columns of the German infantry divisions would take over the protection against the West, at first, which are deployed on the right flank to the rear. Other German forces would get at Yugoslavia from another side, too. It is assumed in this case, that a reinforced Bulgarian border protection exists also along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border.

d) Against Russia:

Sufficient German forces are ready on the German Eastern border, to be used for any purpose. Moreover, German instructor troops are available in Rumania, in addition to the Rumanian army.

e) Against landing attempts:

The German troops are in a position to take a hand at any time in the defense against a possible landing on the Black Sea coast, in cooperation with the air force. Besides, the supreme command of the army List will make its suggestions at the competent German navy office, in order to strengthen the protection of the two ports Varna and Burgas, according to the already known wishes of the Bulgarian supreme command.

The Bulgarian army will also do its part to guarantee the protection of the two ports by providing forces there.

PAGE 4, LINE 32 - PAGE 5, LINE 27:

6). The supply of the German troops on their march through Bulgaria and during their operations against Greece or Turkey will be provided from the own German stocks. However, in order to relieve the railroad and transportation system, especially with regard to feeding facilities, assistance from the Bulgarian side is necessary. This assistance will only be within the limits of the so-called "Contingents". ("Kontingent"). The details about the installation of the necessary dumps, about purchases, payment of work, etc., as well as export and import control, will be regulated by a special commission.

(Remark in pencil) (L IV Is taken care of)

H1154 - 0011

H1154 - 0012

1). In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory.

2). For this purpose, the following units are being formed:

a) One assault group South of Sofia for the advance in direction Skoplje and South, in order to occupy the Southern part of Yugoslavia as basis for the combined attack against Greece and to remove the danger for the rear of the Italian front in Albania.

b) One assault group which will be deployed around Graz and under certain circumstances also in Southwest Hungary, in order to penetrate into Yugoslavia later in the direction Belgrad and Westward.

c) Probably an Hungarian attack group reinforced by German forces which will be committed in the general direction towards the Danube on both sides of Belgrad.

3). If the weather situation permits, the operation against Greece will start on April 2nd or 3rd. In this operation, the right flank will move across Yugoslavian territory. In the beginning, its aim will be limited to the occupation of the basis of Saloniki and the high terrain of Edessa.

4). Therefore, the following tasks result for the participation of the Italian armed forces:

a) Flank protection for the German attack group Graz by advancing towards the line Split-Yajole, with forces as strong as possible.

b) Shifting to the defense on the Greek-Albanian front and deployment of an attack group, in order to join with the German forces committed around Skoplje and South.

c) Elimination of the Yugoslav naval forces.

d) Later on, resumption of the attacks against the Greek front in Albania.

For the inner-political integration of the Yugoslav national territory it is especially desirable to favor the Croat independence movements in every respect and to treat the Croats as friends of the Axis. It will therefore be opportune to avoid any air attacks against Croat territory, as long as it is not a question of commitment against enemy troops fighting there.

5). The following chronological schedule of the German operations may be expected:

a) Attack against Greece: April 2nd-3rd
b) Attack from the area South of Sofia on April 3rd or April 4th
c) Attack from the area around Graz and East of it: April 12th.

(illegible initial)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1746-PS

19 November 1945

I, WALTER R. SELIGSON, 1st Lt., Ord., O-1558914, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpts from Document No. 1746-PS.

WALTER R. SELIGSON
1st Lt., Ord.,
O-1558914

Exhibit 218 121
Filed Dec 7, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C 59
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC 24-G/C-59

Führer's HQ
19 February 1941

Top Secret

10 copies
2nd copy

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 44 187/41, Top Secret, "WFST/Section L (I Op)

S.O. Only
By officer only.

On 18 February the Führer made the following decision regarding the carrying out of operation "Marita":

1. The following dates are envisaged:

Commencement of building bridge: 28 February
Crossing of Danube. 2 March

The final order for carrying out the operation will be given on 26 February at the latest.

It will be decided on 26 February at the latest whether the XIVth Army Corps will march into Bulgaria when bridge-building operations are begun or whether only AA Forces will be moved in.

2. It is for the Bulgarians alone to decide if and when to lay mines off Varna and Burgas.

3. If air attacks are carried out against Bulgaria and Rumania from Greek territory, the Xth Air Corps has freedom of action in operations against Greek territory.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
By Order
signed: Warlimont

DISTRIBUTION:

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C-in-C Command of the Navy (Naval situation report) 2nd Copy
C-in-C Command of the Air Force (Air Force Operational Staff) 3rd Copy

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Armed Forces Operational Staff 4th Copy
Section L 5th-9th Copies
Foreign/Military Intelligence 10th Copy

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C 59

I, S/SGT. Charles E. Bidwell Nr. 13146054 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C59

S/SGT. CHARLES E. BIDWELL
Nr. 13146054.

H1154-0013

Exhibit GB 132
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-167
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NAVAL WAR STAFF
B. Nr. 1. op 355/41 g.K.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - -9.)

B.) Personnel Position.

f.) The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. Fuehrer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

RAEDER.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-167

28 November 1945

I, GERALD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt. Inf. O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document Number C-167, which is paragraph 9.B.f., page 6 of Extract of a meeting between RAEDER and HITLER on 18 March, 1941. (C-152).

GERALD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt. Inf O-1332102

H1154 - 0014

Exhibit GB 119
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 134
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Führer HQ, 21 January 1941

WFSt No. 8/41 Top Secret

Top Secret!
Only thru Officer!

Top Secret!
Only thru Officer!
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Enclosed please find a short resumè of the speech made by the Führer during the final conference with the Duce on 20 January 41, and a summary on the results of the conference held by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces with General Guzzoni on the 19 January 41.

for the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

J o d l

- 2 enclosures -

Distribution:

OKH (GenStdH)	1st copy
OKM (Skl.)	2nd copy
Ob.D.L. (Iw.Fü.St. Ia)	3rd copy
OKW/WFSt	4th copy
L	5th copy
Aus.	6th copy

Top Secret

Enclosure 1 to OKW/WFSt No. 8/41 top secret
Top Secret!
Only thru officer!

6 copies
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Result on the Conference of the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces with the Italian General Guzzoni on the 19 January 41

1. Important Items from the Appreciation of the Situation by General Guzzoni.

1.) Albania

The most important Italian theatre of war. Though front not sufficiently secure to make it certain that the present line can be held against Greek attacks in all circumstances, no danger of Valona or Berat being lost. 21 divs. now in Albania. Intention is to send another 3 divs. from Italy.

Intention to form a group for attack on the northern flank. Strength about 10 divs. (including 3 divs. still to be brought from Italy and 4 Alpine divs.). Will not be ready for attack

Top Secret

H1154-0015

H1154-0016

before another 2½ months, since transport facilities do not make it possible to ship the 3 divs. or the personnel and equipment required for the reinforcement of the remaining divs any faster. Intention to attack with this group in direction Korica, from there, some units to carry out a flanking movement to Erseke in order to cause the collapse of the northern part of the Greek front, the main body to continue the attack in the direction of Florina as soon as supplies are safeguarded beyond Korica (only 1 road available). Abandoned intention of making an attack with a limited objective along the coast in the near future.

2.) Libya

Intention for continuation of campaign:
Holding of Tobruk as long as possible. Defence of the Derna - Eastern edge of the Djebel line, using the armoured unit stationed at Mekili for offensive action. Sending of reinforcements from Tripoli to Cyrenaica in order to strengthen the defence planned there, in case the situation in Cyrenaica continues to develop favourably, thus making it possible to hold the western part of Cyrenaica.
If Cyrenaica cannot be held, defence of Tripoli.
Italians believe that Tobruk can hold out for some time and that British Will not advance upon Benghazi - Agedabia before the fall of Tobruk.
The following reinforcements are earmarked for Libya:-
Bringing the 3 divs. stationed in Tripoli up to full strength, transferring 1 armoured div. and 1 infantry div. (motorized) from Italy to Tripoli. Completion of these transports about 20 February 41.

3.) East Africa

Situation difficult in the case of British attack, which is expected in the near future. Defence to the utmost intended. It is desirable to divert British forces from Libya to East Africa, even though it may render the situation in East Africa more difficult.

4.) Dodekanese

Expected attack on Dodekanese has not hitherto taken place. Supplies in hand for about 3 months. Forces in Dodekanese weak (handwritten marginal note:- these ought to be considerably increased), nevertheless a certain offensive power in the case of a German attack upon Greece from Bulgarian territory (especially against British transports from Egypt into the Aegaean).

II. Views on the Italian Appreciation of the Situation

1.) Albania

Very unlikely that the Italians will be able to muster the forces requited for an attack within the time provided. A support of a German attack from Bulgaria against Greece must therefore be discounted. (Handwritten marginal note:- the German attack will however bring strong relief to the Albanian front)

2.) Libya

Whether or not Cyrenaica can be held cannot yet be determined. Unless the situation is basically changed, a loss also of Tripoli need not be feared, all the more since from May onwards large-scale operations will no more be possible, owing to the heat (Handwritten marginal notes:- the loss of Morzuk (S) is evidently considered trifling. Contitio sine qua non:- no complications out of Tunis).

3.) East Africa

Duration of resistance in the case of a British attack cannot be estimated.

4.) Dodekanese

No resistance of any significance is to be expected in the case of attack. Offensive action of the Italian forces stationed there against British transports to Greece cannot be counted on (Handwritten marginal note:- ought to be built up in order to form an important complementary operation during the occupation of Greece.)

III. Employment of German Units in Libya and Albania

1.) Libya

Italians very warmly welcome the dispatch of the 5th light div. (motorized) composed as suggested. Shipment to Tripoli can begin approximately between 15 and 20 February; it will however be possible to carry out transports of equipment before that date.

H1154 - 0017

2.) Albania
Dispatch of a German unit is described by Italians as desirable, but not necessary. Dispatch of a corps impossible, as transport facilities inadequate. For reasons of transport, dispatch of only one mountain div. with light equipment could be considered. Decision not urgent at the moment. Italian attack - unless strong Greek forces are moved from the Albanian front to the Bulgarian frontier - impossible in any case before the beginning of April, therefore German unit need not be sent before March. Consequently new decision whether a unit is to be sent, at the beginning of March. Preparations for making a unit available will however continue.

- - - - - - - - - -

Enclosure 2 to OKW/WFSt No. 8/41 top secret
Top Secret

6 copies
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Only thru officer

Speech by the Führer
on 20 January 1941

1.) On 20 January at 1100 hrs., a report is made to the Führer by the Chiefs of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and of the Armed Forces Operational Staff in the presence of General von Rintelen on the result of the military discussions with General Guzzoni and General Gandin.

II.) At 1200 hours, the Führer developed before a wider circle his thoughts and views on the situation.
Those present:-

on the German side	on the Italian side
The Minister for Foreign Affairs	the Duce
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces	Count Ciano
Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff	General Guzzoni
General von Rintelen	General Marras
Ambassador Schmidt	General Gandin
An interpreter from the Foreign Office	
Colonel Schmundt	
Freg. Kapt. von Puttkamer	

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

Contents of the Führer's Speech in Concise Form:-
Finland of great importance to us owing to the nickel findings unique in Europe. Russians promise to supply us with the quantity of nickel required, but only as long as they pleased. Therefore Finland must not be interfered with any more.

Demarche of the Russians on account of our massing of troops in Roumania has taken place and will be duly rejected. Russians always become insolent at a time when they cannot be harmed (winter).

The massing of troops in Roumania serves a threefold purpose:-
a) an operation against Greece
b) protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey
c) safeguarding the guarantee to Roumania.

Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces, altogether therefore very strong forces whose deployment far from our base requires a long time.

Desirable that this deployment is completed without interference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment.

For this reason - as well as owing to the difficulties of transpor which came to light during yesterday's military discussions - it is not advisable at present to dispatch a German unit to Albania. If it remained stationary behind the front, psychologically undesirable reactions would result: Italians in heavy fighting - Germans look on from behind the front.

However if the German unit is employed, the war in the southeast, too, will be prematurely started.

As far as can be foreseen, Turkey will remain neutral; it would be very unpleasant if she declared her solidarity with Britain and put her airfields at Britain's disposal (handwritten marginal note:- Constantinopel - Constanza: 350 km).

General situation in the East can be judged correctly only from the situation in the West. The attack against the British Isles is our ultimate aim.

In this respect, we are in the position of a man with only one round left in his rifle; if he misses, the situation is much worse than before. The landing cannot be repeated, since too much equipment would be lost in the case of a failure. Britain would then have no need to worry any more and could employ the bulk of her forces at the periphery wherever she pleases. As long as the attack has not taken place, the British must always reckon with the possibility.

A landing can only be made under certain conditions which, however, did not exist in Fall:- no three consecutive days of good weather.

Apart from that, the general task in the West is the protection of our base from Kirkenes to the Spanish frontier, at the same time always keeping a group of forces in Southern France ready to step in if Britain should gain a foothold in Portugal.

The blocking of the Sicily passage by the air force is only a poor substitute for the possession of Gibraltar. We had made such preparations as would have ensured success. Once in possession of Gibraltar, we would be in a position to gain a foothold with strong forces in North Africa and thus put an end to Weygand's blackmail. If therefore Italy were after all to succeed in getting France to enter the war, this would be a great success and would basically change the situation in the Mediterranean within a short space of time.

I don't see great danger coming from America even if she should enter the war. The much greater danger is the gigantic block of Russia. Though we have very favourable political and economic agreements with Russia, I prefer to rely on powerful means at my disposal. Very considerable parts of these are therefore tied down on the Russian frontier, thus preventing me from supplying the armament industry with sufficient manpower to bring the armament of the air force and navy to the highest possible pitch.

As long as Stalin lives, there is probably no danger; he is intelligent and careful. But should he cease to be there, the Jews, who at present only occupy second and third-rank positions might move up again into the first rank.

It therefore behoves us to be careful. The Russians are continually trying to work out new demands which they read into the agreements. That is why they do not like explicit and precise formulas in these.

It is therefore necessary to keep a constant eye on the Russian factor and to keep on guard, by means of strength and clever diplomacy. Formerly Russia would have been no danger at all: for on land she cannot imperil us in the least, but now in the era of the air force, the Roumanian oilfields can be turned into an expanse of smoking debris from Russia and from the Mediterranean, and the life of the axis depends on those oilfields.

In any case we must not dispatch valuable units to places where they will remain inactive. Therefore we shall send to Libya not an armoured but an anti-tank unit, which can be transported more quickly and can still be employed before the hot period sets in. For employed it shall be:- we do not want to act like the British did in France. The tanks and the anti-tank guns in this unit penetrate any British tank which is in action there.

The troops are experienced, have confidence in their weapons and are self-reliant that is very important in the fight against tanks. We have given the name "tank-hunters" to the anti-tank gunners also for psychological reasons. They are to seek out the enemy tank and battle it like the huntsman his quarry.

H1154 - 0018

H1154-0019

General statements on the factors which are decisive for success in modern warfare. In the course of these. reference to the importance of training in up-to-date methods of warfare. which requires much time and effort and a highly efficient body of non-commissioned officers.

Importance of the air force and of the armored warfare. The training of an armoured unit is beset with difficulties it is least possible to form an armoured unit by improvisation. Even the conversion of a fully trained armoured unit to other weapons takes months.

We have not achieved our great successes with armoured troops by working with heavy tanks. We prefer medium tanks. The French had very much heavier tanks than we had.

Our greatest asset were our panzer-generals who have developed completely new tactics and have directed their units very cleverly and with an offensive spirit.

General reference to the importance of mines in land warfare.
Examples:- mining of our west wall.
Blockade by mines which were laid by the 16th army in the flank of our attack against France.
By means of mines, a field of attack can be completely messed up.

Question of the Führer about mines at Tobruk and whether further mines could not be brought in by U-boats.

Tanks lose all offensive spirit as soon as they encounter minefields. Great heroism by the engineer is required to remove or clear minefields.

Views on the war in the air and the comparison of German to British air raids.

It is necessary to have at one's disposal a mighty anti-aircraft weapon with a great ammunition supply for a moment may come when the war will be conducted almost exclusively by the air force and the navy.

Against heavily armed ships. only the dive-bomber is successful.

Führer dwells on the excellent impression he has gained of General Antonescu. He really is a personality.

The Duce is of the opinion that his relations to the Legion are not good.

Führer goes into generalizations on the subject of revolutions. of which only the Fascist and the National Socialist ones have had an immediately constructive effect. In Roumanis the predestined man was murdered before the outbreak and the first-rank leaders of the legion with him. Thus it came about that the leading may grew out of the Army, who started off the revolution and removed the king. He is inspired by glowing fanaticism, is ready for any battle for his country and will wage it with, without, or if necessary even against the Legion.

One man must be the Führer, a head of State and beside him a leader of a movement are not possible. It would be best if Antonescu became simultaneously the leader of the Legion.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C134

10 Nov 45

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C 134

GOETZ MAYER
T/5 33812169

Exhibit D.B. 118
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 448-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Fuehrer and Supreme of the Armed Forces.
OWK/WFST/Abt. L Nr. 44018/41 g. K. Chiefs

F. H. Q. 11th Ja- -1
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Order No. 22

Participation of German Forces in the Fighting in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation demands for strategical, political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.

Tripolitania must be held and the danger of a collapse of the Albanian front must be removed. Beyond that, the Army group Cavallero, in connection with later operations of the 12th Army, shall be enabled to start an attack also from Albania.

I order therefore, the following:

1) A blocking unit is to be recruited by the High Command of the Army which will be in a position to render valuable services to our Allies in the defense of Tripolitania especially against the English armored divisions. The principles for its composition will be given separately. The preparations for the transfer of the unit will be made in time to follow immediately the present transport of an Italian armored division and a motorized division to Tripoli. (starting approximately 20 February)

2) The X Air Corps will retain Sicily as basis for operations. Its most important assignment will be the fight against the English Naval forces and their communications between the western and eastern Mediterranian. Besides that, provisions are also to be made, with the help of temporary landing fields, to attack the English unloading harbors and supply bases on the coast of Western Egypt and Cryenaica and thus give immediate support to the Army group of Graziani.

The Italian Government has been asked to declare the territory between Sicily and the North African coast a "restricted area" (Sperr - gebiet) in order to facilitate the operations of the X Air Corps and to avoid incidents against neutral ships.

3) For transfer to Albania, German units in the approximate strength of one corps, among them the 1st Mountain Division and Armored forces, are to be provided and held in readiness. The transport of the 1st Mountain Division is to commence, as soon as the approval of the Italians is received by the High Command of the Armed forces. In the meantime, it must be examined and determined with the Italian High Command in Albania whether and how many more forces for operational attacks could be employed to good advantage and could also be supplied besides the Italian Divisions.

The duty of the German forces will be:

a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there;

b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:

To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation,

To open up the straits west of Saloniki from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List's Army.

H1154 - 0020

H1154-0021

4) The directives for the questions of authority over the German troops to be employed in North Africa and Albania and the restrictions which are to be made with reference to their employment, will be settled by the High Command of the Armed Forces and the Italian Armed Forces staff.

5) The suitable transports available in the Mediterranean only as far as they are not already used for transportations to Tripoli, to be provided for the transfer of the Albania-bound troops. For transports of personnel, the transportation group Ju 52 stationed in Foggia is to be utilized.

Every effort should be made to complete the transfer of the bulk of the German forces to Albania before the transfer of the blocking unit to Lybia starts, (See 1) and the use of all German boats becomes necessary for this purpose.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler

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F. H. Q. 29th Jan 41

High Command of the Armed Forces
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Ref: The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
OKW/WFST/Abt. L(L) Nr. 44018/41 gk Chefs. V.
11th Jan. 41

The measures ordered in Order 22 are to be given the following code names:

Operation Tripoli: "Sonnenblume"
Operation Albania: "Alpenveilchen"

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.

By order
(Signed) Warlimont

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 448-PS

17 November 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/Sgt, 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 448-PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/Sgt, 33779426

H1154 - 0022

Exhibit G.B. 117
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

Translation of Document 1541
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

Top Military Secret.

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces High Command/armed Forces,
Command Staff/armed forces
Section L.Nr.33 406/40.

Top Secret

Fuehrer // 9
13 December 1940

Matter of Chief
Only through Officer
(illegible notations)

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Direction Number 20.
OPERATION MARITA.

1). The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is double necessary that the British endeavour be foiled to create an bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.

2). My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next months.

(b) After the setting in of favourable weather, probably in March, to send the task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.

3). For the concentration of the task force in Rumania are necessary:

(a) The 16th Panzer Division which arrives in December on an army mission, and whose task remains unchanged.
(b) Following will be a task force of about seven divisions (final wave) to be despatched to Southern Rumania. Engineers in the required strength for the preparation of the Danube crossing can conveniently be attached for transport to the 16th Panzer Division (as instructional troops). The field commander of the army will await my decision for the proper moment for them to be employed on the Danube.

(c) Preparations are to be made for further transport to take in the calculated maximum for the operation Marita (total of 24 divisions)
(d) It is the mission of the Air Force to give air protection to the concentration, as well as preparing the necessary primary and reserve installations on Rumania soil.

4). The Operation Marita itself is to be prepared on the following basis:
(a) The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast, and the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth.
(b) Flank protection against Turkey will be the task of the Bulgarian forces, although it is to be secured and strengthened through the alerting of German Forces.
(c) It is not certain whether the Bulgarian forces will take part in the attack. Likewise the Yugoslavs position cannot yet be clearly determined.
(d) It will be the mission of the Air Force to support the drive of the army in all phases, to liquidate the opposing air force, and, as far as possible, to occupy British strongpoints on the Greek Islands through airborne landings.
(e) The question in which fashion the Operation Marita is to be supported by the Italian forces, and how coordination of the operations is to take place, awaits a later decision.

5.) The military preparations which will produce exceptional political results in the Balkans demands the exact control of all the necessary measures by the General Staff.

The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be reported

H1154 - 0024

step by step by the General Staff of the armed forces and are to be explain at first as a strengthening of the German Army mission in Rumania.

Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point t intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject to my consent also the sending of scouting missions and advanced parties.

6). After the completion of the operation Marita it is contemplated to use the access of the forces used therein for a new undertaking .

7) I anticipate reports of the Chiefs concerning their plans, which has already taken place as regards the Army. I want to be presented with exact timetable for the planned preparations, as well as for the necessary recall- ings from the armament industry (reconstructions of Furlough Divisions)

Signed: ADOLF HITLER.

Witnessed
(Signature unreadable)
Captain in the General Staff

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
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10 November

I, PFC ERNST W. COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No.1541 PS.

ERNST W. COHN.
PFC.33925738.

Exhibit GB 116
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 444-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

Fuehrer's Headquarters
12 November 40
2F 408

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Directive No. 18

The preparatory measures of Supreme HQ for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:-

1. Relations with France

The aim of my policy towards France is to cooperate with this country in the most effective way for the future prosecution of the war against England. For the time being France will have the role of a "non-belligerent power" :- she will have to tolerate German military measures on her territory, especially in the African colonies, and to give support, as far as possible, even by using her own means of defense. The most pressing task of the French is the defensive and offensive protection of their French possessions (West and Equatorial Africa) against England and the de Gaulle movement. From this initial task France's participation in the war against England can develop fully.

For the time being, the conversations with France resulting from my meeting with Marshal Petain are being carried on - apart from the current work of the armistice commission - entirely by the foreign office (Auswartiges Amt) in cooperation with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW).

More detailed directives will follow at the close of these talks.

2. Spain and Portugal

Political steps to bring about an early Spanish entry into the war have been taken. The aim of German intervention in the Iberian peninsula (code name Felix) will be to drive the English out of the Western Mediterranean. For this purpose:

a) Gibraltar will be taken and the Straits closed.
b) The British will be prevented from gaining a foothold at another point of the Iberian peninsula, or the Atlantic Islands.

The preparation and execution of this operation is intended as follows:

Section I

a) Reconnaissance troops (officers in civilian clothes) make the necessary preparations for the action against Gibraltar and for taking over aerodromes. As regards disguise and cooperation with the Spaniards they will comply with the security measures of the Chief of Foreign Intelligence.

b) Special units of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau are to take over the protection of the Gibraltar area, in secret cooperation with the Spaniards, against English attempts to widen the terrain in front and against premature discovery and frustration of our preparations.

H1154 - 0025

H1154 - 0026

c) The units intended for this operation will be kept in readiness away from the French Spanish border and information will be withheld from the troops, at this early stage. In order to start operations, a warning order will be given three weeks before the troops cross the Spanish-French border (but only after conclusion of the preparations regarding the Atlantic Islands).

With regard to the low capacity of the Spanish railways, the army will detail mainly motorized units for this operation, so that the railways are available for reinforcements.

Section II

a) Units of the Air Force, directed by observation at Algeciras, will, at a favourable moment, carry out an air attack from French soil on the units of the British fleet lying in the port of Gibraltar, and will force a landing on Spanish aerodromes after the attack.

b) Shortly after this the units intended for use in Spain will cross the Franco-Spanish frontier on land or in the air.

Section III

a) Attack for the seizure of Gibraltar by German troops.

b) Mobilization of troops to march into Portugal should the British gain a foothold there. The units intended for this will march into Spain immediately after the units intended for Gibraltar.

Section IV

Support by the Spanish in closing the Straits after the seizure of the Rock from the Spanish-Moroccan side as well, if required.

As for the strength of the units to be used for operation "Felix" the following will apply:

Army

The units intended for Gibraltar must be in sufficient strength to seize the Rock even without Spanish assistance.

Apart from this, a smaller group must be available to aid the Spaniards in the unlikely event of the British attempting to land at a different point on the coast. The units to be kept in readiness for a possible invasion of Portugal are to be predominantly of a mobile nature.

Air Force

Sufficient forces will be detailed for the air attack on Gibralter to guarantee substantial success.

For the subsequent operations against naval objectives and for the support of the attack on the Rock mainly dive-bomber units are to be transferred to Spain.

Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is to be supplied to the army units, and is also to be used to engage ground targets.

Navy

Provision is to be made for U-boats to attack the British-Gibraltar-Squadron, particularly when they leave harbor, which they are expected to do after the air raid.

To support the Spaniards in the closing of the Straits, preparations are to be made in cooperation with the army for the transfer of single coastal batteries.

H1154 - 0027

An Italian participation is not envisaged.

As a result of operation "Gibraltar", the Atlantic Islands (in particular the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands) will gain increased importance for the British conduct of the war at sea, as well as for our own. The commanders in chief of the Navy and Air Force are examining how the Spanish defense of the Canaries can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be occupied.

I also request that the question of an occupation of Madeira and the Azores be examined and also the advantages and disadvantages that would arise from this for the conduct of the war at sea and in the air. The results of this examination are to be given to me as soon as possible.

3) Italian Offensive against Egypt

If at all, the use of German forces only comes into consideration after the Italians have reached Mersa Metruh. Even then the use of German air forces will be considered mainly if the Italians put at our disposal the air bases necessary for this.

The preparations of the branches of the armed forces for use in this or any other North African theatre of war are to be carried on as follows:-

Army

Holding an armoured division ready for use in North Africa (composition as previously provided for).

Navy

Fitting out of such German ships lying in Italian ports as are suitable as transports for the transfer of the strongest possible forces either to Libya or to North West Africa.

Air Force

Preparations for attacks on Alexandria and on the Suez Canal, so as to deny the British Command the use of the latter.

4) Balkans

The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Roumanian oil area.

In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.

So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations.

H1154-0028

The German Air Force mission in Roumania will be increased to the extent proposed to me.

Bulgarian requests to equip their army (supplyof weapons, ammunition) are to be given favourable treatment.

5) Russia

Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by, me.

6) Landing in England

Due to a change in the general situation it may yet be possible or necessary to start operation "Seelöwe" in the spring of 1941. The three services of the armed forces must therefore earnestly endeavour to improve conditions for such an operation in every respect.

7) I shall expect the commanders-in-chief to express their opinions of the measures anticipated in this directive. I shall then give orders regarding the methods of execution and synchronization of the individual actions. In order to assure secrecy, only a restricted staff will work on these plans. This applies particularly to the operations in Spain and for the plans concerning the Atlantic Isles.

signed: ADOLF HITLER

initialled: Jodl

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 444-PS

15 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 444-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-1335567

Exhibit G.B. 115
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT 2762-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(page 1)

Duce!

Allow me at the beginning of this letter to assure you that my heart and my thoughts have been, in the last 14 days, more than ever with you. Be further assured, Duce, of my determination to do all which can in the present situation be of aid to you.

When I asked you to receive me in Florence, I began the journey in the hope that I could make my thoughts known to you before the threatening confliot with Greece, of which I had received only general knowledge.

I wanted to ask you first of all to postpone the battle, if possible to a more favourable time of year, in any case however, until after the American presidential election.

In any case, however, I wanted to ask you, Duce, not to undertake this battle without a previous lightning-like occupation of Crete, and for this purpose I wanted also to bring along for you practical suggestions for the commitment of a German parachute division and a further airborne division .

+ + + + + + + + +

(Page 7)

. . . . d) Jugoslavia must become disinterested, but if possible by even being positively interested in our point of view, co-operate in cleaning up the Greek question. Without security on the part of Jugoslavia, no successful operation in the Balkans is to be risked. . . .

+ + + + + + + + +

(Page 8)

I must, however, unfortunately observe that conducting a war in the Balkans is not possible before March. Therefore, any threatening move toward Jugoslavia would be useless, since the impossibility of a materialization of such threats before March is well known to the Serbian general staff. Therefore, Jugoslavia must be won, if at all possible, by other ways and means. . . .

With hearty greetings in faithful comradeship, your

/s/ Adolf Hitler

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2762-PS

17 November 1945.

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/Sgt, 33779426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2762-PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN
M/Sgt, 33779426

1462.

H1154 - 0029

vide G.B. 48

II

Memorandum of a Conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano. Obersalzberg, August 12, 1939

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At the beginning of the conversation the Führer, with the aid of maps showed Count Ciano the present position of Germany from a military point of view. He particularly emphasised the German western fortifications. There were the points at which in earlier times the French, for geographical and strategical reasons, had always attempted a "break-through". These points had now been protected with special care, so that a "break-through" was impossible at any of them. The western fortifications had been carried along the Luxemboorg and Belgian frontiers to the borders of Holland so that a violation of the Belgian frontier would no longer bring any advantages to France, but would invoke the serious risk that Belgium, in order to defend her neutrality, and under pressure of the Flemish element in her population, would place herself on the German side. The one remaining possibility of attack was, theoretically, across the Netherlands, but, according to the view of the Führer, the Dutch would defend their neutrality with energy because they knew that if they took part in a general war they knew they would lose to Japan their almost undefended east-Asian colonies. Furthermore, in view of the countless rivers and canals, and of the possibility of flooding wide areas of the lowlands, the Netherlands offered very unsuitable territory as a starting-off point for a great army. Germany would obviously invade the Netherlands, in the event of a violation of Dutch neutrality and, owing to the very short distance of the German frontier from the Meuse, could reach this river within a few hours. Finally the Rhine, which in Holland was 1 - 1½ miles broad, offered a natural protection against attacks from this direction.

The third possibility of an attack in Germany consisted in blockade by the British navy. In this connexion it should be remembered that the great range of the latest German bombers brought the whole of England within their sphere of action and would allow them to attack the blockading ships from the air. There were no other possibilities of attacking Germany. The Scandinavian countries would doubtless remain neutral and they were certain that neither side would attack them because the occupation of countries as large as Norway and Sweden hardly came into consideration (it was not a practical question). Similarly Switzerland would certainly oppose to the uttermost any attempt on her neutrality.

In the East Germany had also erected strong defences. The Führer showed Count Ciano the various defence systems of East Prussia. On the other frontier strong fortifications were being constructed and as on the Polish frontier opposite Berlin was built up into an impregnable system of successor lines. The capital, however, was only 150 km. from the Polish frontier, and therefore exposed to air attack especially because, owing to its great size, it could be bombed from a very great height without attacking particular targets but with a certainty that bombs would fall somewhere within the city area.

Turning to the military position of the Western Powers the Führer pointed again to the vulnerability of England from the air. British aircraft production had made progress, but protected measures against raids were still much in arrears. It was known that England had decided only in the previous Autumn upon the definite type of anti-aircraft gun. The German experience of their own seven years of rearmament assured them that large scale production was possible only some long time after the selection of a prototype, so that no real anti-aircraft protection could come into existence in England for one or two years. Furthermore, London and all the large British cities and centres of industry suffered from the same disadvantage as Berlin in relation to air attack; bombing can be carried out from a great height and out of range of English anti-aircraft guns with the complete certainty that the results would always be successful.

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At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements in prospect. Some time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction could be taken into service. As far as the land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been called to the colours. If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she could send to France at the most two infantry divisions and one armoured division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons but hardly any fighters since, at the outbreak of war the German Air Force would at once attack England and the English fighters would be urgently needed for the defence of their own country. With regard to the position of France, the Führer said that in the event of a general war, after the destruction of Poland, (which would not take long) Germany would be in a position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line for the life and death struggle which would then ensue. The Führer also thought that the French would find it no easier to overrun theItalian fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt.

The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in anti-tank and anti-aircraft defence and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in this respect. If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western Powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas was different, furthermore, it was necessary to consider the position of the Polish state. Out of 34,000,000 inhabitants, 1½ million were German, about 4 million were Jews and 9 million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much less in number than the total population and as already said, their striking power was not to be valued highly. In these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the shortest time.

Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made it clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on the side of the enemy of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation. Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other, while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind. The Führer had told the Prince Regent on his visit to Germany that, with special relation to Italy, he should make a gesture showing that he sided politically with the Axis and thought of a closer connexion with the Axis and of the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed with the latter proposal. The Prince Regent had recently been to London and had tried there to reinsure himself with the Western Powers. He had thus taken the same line as Gafencu who had also been extremely reasonable during his visit to Germany and had repudiated an interest in the importance of the Western Democracies. It appeared that subsequently Gafencu had taken up an opposite standpoint in England. Of the Balkan countries, the Axis could trust completely Bulgaria alone as to some extent a natural ally of Italy and Germany. Therefore Germany had supplied Bulgaria as far as possible with armaments and would continue to do so. Yugoslavia would remain neutral only as long as it was dangerous for her to come openly on to the side of the Western Democracies. If matters took a turn for the worse for Germany and Italy, Yugoslavia would openly join the other side in the hope that she would then influence the course of events to take an official turn to the disadvantage of the Axis. Roumania was afraid of Hungary and from the military point of view externally weak and internally corrupt. King Carol would certainly abandon his neutrality if he

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were compelled to do so. Hungary was friendly and Slovakia was under German influence with German garrisons in certain areas.

Coming back to the Danzig question, the Führer said that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and north easterly direction of German policy. The east and north-east, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been Germany's undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial, as the Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy. For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and timber from these eastern regions. In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, although the city had the greatest harbour in the Baltic. Danzig was a Nuremberg of the north, an ancient German city awaking sentimental feelings for every German and the Führer was bound to take account of this psychological element in public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over anything of this kind.

Count Ciano in replying to the Führer's statement first expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during his Berlin visit had there been any sign from the German side that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion, the Danzig question would be settled in the course of time. On these grounds, the Duce in view of his conviction that a conflict with the Western powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he should make his preparations for this event he had made plans for a period of two or three years. If immediate conflict were unavoidable, the Duce as he had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German side but for various reasons he would welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later time. Ciano then showed with the aid of a map, the position of Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict with Poland would not be limited to that country but would develop into a general European war.

The Führer commented that on this point there were differences of opinion. He personally was absolutely certain that the Western Democracies in the last resort would shrink from entering into a general war.

Count Ciano replied that he wished that the Führer were right, but that he did not think so, in any case it was necessary to consider the most unfavourable case that is to say a general war. Since the Abyssinian war, Italy had lived in a perpetual state of war and therefore needed a breathing space. Ciano then gave figures to show how great the material effort of Italy had been in relation to the Spanish war. Italian supplies of raw material were completely exhausted and it is necessary to allow time for their replacement. The Italian war industries which were in exposed sites and must also be moved south for purposes of defence. The Italian artillery, especially anti-aircraft guns, greatly needed modernisation. The long coast line and other exposed places were most insufficiently defended. The naval position was also most unfavourable. At present Italy could only provide two battleships to meet the eleven or twelve battleships of the combined British and French fleet whereas, in a few years she would have eight more ships at her disposition. (These figures were disputed by the Führer). Ciano said that the long Italian coast was difficult to defend and that the Anglo-French fleets had many bases at their disposition and particularly in harbours of Greece.

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Italy was especially vulnerable in her colonies although Libya was difficult to attack from Egypt, and the Italians might be able to reach Mersamatruh. On the other hand the position was very different in Tunis. The relation between the Italian-Arab and the French-Arab population there was 1-20, while the strength of the European troops was 1-5 to the disadvantage of Italy. Furthermore, the Italian fortifications on the side of the French frontier were completely insufficient and new pillboxes were needed.

Abyssinia was almost pacified as far as certain areas along the frontier merging with British territory were concerned. English gold and propaganda raised trouble upon the population. This pacification, however, was only superficial. In a general war it would suffice if a few English aeroplanes were to drop leaflets in Abyssinia maintaining that the world had risen against Italy and that the Negus would come back to cross the Abyssinian frontier. Furthermore, in the case of war Abyssinia would be completely cut off from Italy and the fate of the 200,000 Italians in the country would be completely uncertain. In a few days there would be an army of 4 to 5,000,000 men in Abyssinia able to advance successfully. In the case of war against the Sudan, Kenya and French Somaliland, the islands of the Dodecanese would be in a difficult position owing to the attitude of Turkey. Leros and Rhodes could defend themselves for years. Albania was a completely undeveloped country and could not for some years to come form a workable basis of operations against the Balkans, roads would have to be built and it would be necessary to exploit the mineral wealth, iron, copper, chrome and oil, after which a successful advance could be made to Salonika and other directions in the Balkans.

In the economic sphere Italy had plans of autarky which would take some years for realisation after which she would be in a position to endure a longer war without difficulties. An additional reason for the Duce's wish to postpone the conflict, was the question of the Italians abroad who should be brought back to Italy according to plan. There were a million Italians in France from whom about 700,000 could be regarded as still belonging to Italy, the remaining 300,000, however, in the case of war with France would be used as hostages as was clear from the measures taken in France in September of the previous year.

Finally the Duce himself set great importance upon carrying through the Rome Exhibition in the year 1942 for which the large scale preparations had been made and from which in the economic sphere and particularly in the matter of foreign currencies favourable results were expected.

In addition to these considerations especially affecting Italy there were other factors of a general political kind tending to favour the postponement of a general war. According to the Duce's view the encirclement policy of the Western Democracies would certainly function at the present time but, after an interval of time, the points of difference and the fundamental lack of unity between the parties of the encirclement front would make themselves felt and the front would accordingly fall to pieces.

Finally the Duce was convinced that the present strong state of feeling in England and France would not last very much longer especially in France the union sacree would break up in party quarrels if sufficient time were allowed on the side of the Axis. At the moment the Axis itself was responsible for the fact that party differences had been set aside in the countries concerned.

The position of Japan would also be considerably strengthened in two years time after the expected conclusion of the China war, while the position of Roosevelt in America would be severely shaken after a period of external tranquility, so that he would not be elected to the presidency for a third time, whereas his election was certain if war broke out. Spain which had just secured a government friendly to the Axis needed a period of rest after the Civil War but in two to three years time would be in fact a considerable factor on the side of the Axis, e.g. within two years Spain proposed

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to build four battleships of 35,000 tons, the plans of which had recently been brought to Spain by an Italian General. This construction would take place at Ferrol.

For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany. This could be done through the publication of a communique which Ciano had already given to Ribbentrop (then follows the text of the proposed communique). Ciano said that the Duce had in mind a proposal for an international conference. The Führer declared that if a conference were held, Russia could no longer be excluded from future meetings of the Powers. In the German-Russian conversations, the Russians had made it clear with reference to Munich and other occasions, when they were excluded, that in future they would not submit to such treatment. In addition to the four great Powers and apart from Russia, Poland and Spain must also be summoned to a conference. That would mean, however, that Italy and Spain would be ranged against England, France, Russia and Poland, i.e. an unfavourable position. Ciano said that the Duce considered that the party would win at a conference which was ready in given circumstances to allow the conference to fail and take into account the eventuality of war as a result of failure. The Duce had, however, given consideration to the Fuhrer's view and had turned down his proposal. He was in favour of a peaceful gesture on the part of Italy and Germany saying that the Western Powers were not really ready for war. These Powers, however, according to the conviction of the Duce, who obtained very valuable information about the Democracies, would certainly begin war at the present time if they were in any way driven into a corner by the Axis and saw no other way out. The proposed German-Italian gesture offered an honourable way out which the democracies would certainly use for avoiding war. Wide circles warned them against war and the position of this (anti-war) party would naturally be considered strengthened by a peaceful gesture. Poland, from which the Western Powers would certainly draw apart, would be isolated after a certain time and be ready to accept reasonable solutions to the outstanding difficulties.

The Führer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn, the more difficult would military operations in Eastern Europe become. From the middle of September, weather conditions made air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the condition of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for motorised forces. From September to May, Poland was a great marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations. Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in September and Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously could not bombard or destroy the place.

Ciano asked how soon, according to the Führer's view, the Danzig question must be settled. The Führer answered that this settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August. To the question of Ciano's: what solution the Führer proposed? Hitler answered that Poland must give up political control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would obviously be reserved and that Polish general behaviour must contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since up to the present the German proposals had been refused. The Führer had made this proposal personally to Beck at his visit to Obersalzberg. They were extremely favourable to Poland. In return for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete guarantee of Polish interests and the establishment of a connexion between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would have given a frontier guarantee, a 25 years pact of friendship and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck had received the proposal with remark that he was willing to examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia and even

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proposed to advance to Berlin. It was unendurable for a Great Power to tolerate a neighbour of such hostile disposition at 150 kilometres from its capital. The Führer had therefore resolved to use the occasion of the next Polish provocation in the form of an ultimatum, the brutal ill-treatment of Germans in Poland, an attempt to starve out Danzig or the invasion of Poland within 48 hours and in this way to leave the problem. This would mean a considerable strengthening of the Axis just as an Italian liquidation of Yugoslavia would also mean an increase in strength. Ciano asked what action of this kind against Poland was to be expected because Italy must amply prepare herself for all eventualities. The Führer answered that in the circumstances a move against Poland must be reckoned with at any minute.

During this exchange of conversation the Führer was given a telegram from Moscow and a telegram from Tokio. The conversation was interrupted for a short time and Ciano was then told the text of the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the despatch of a German political negotiat to Moscow. Ribbentrop added that the Russians were fully informed of the intentions of Germany with regard to Poland. He himself at the Führer's orde had informed the Russian Charge d'Affaires, the Führer added that according to his opinion Russia would not be ready to take the chestnuts out of the fir for the Western Powers. Stalin's position would be endangered as much by a victorious as by a defeated Russian army. Russian interest was to extend her access to the Balkans. Germany had nothing against this. On the other hand, Russia would never interfere on behalf of Poland whom she hated whole-heartedl The sending of the Anglo-French Military Mission to Moscow had only one purpo i.e. to conceal the catastrophic position of the political negotiations.

After a further consideration over the communique proposal the Fuhrer said that he would consider this proposal and Ciano's news about the general situation for inter-aid. He therefore proposed that the discussions should be continued on the following day.

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III

Memorandum of a conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano at Obersalzberg August 13, 1939

The Führer said that since the last conversation, he had been considering the whole position. Ribbentrop had meanwhile told him that in the circumstances Ciano had decided not to conclude the conversations with a communique. The Führer agreed with this decision. The door was therefore open, no-one was committed and no course was blocked.

The Führer had also come to the conclusion, as he had said in a previous conversation, that the danger of delaying too long into the autumn was that Poland would be able to carry out its relatively limited aims. Danzig could be made to submit by slow pressure and the treaty position was extremely favourable to Poland. Danzig could be blockaded and slowly ruined or even starved out from the second half of September and particularly from the beginning of October. The Poles could easily occupy the place. This occupation would be followed by a re-conquest of the Corridor and Danzig on the German side but any further military operations would be impossible at the present time of the year. Danzig therefore would fall into ruin, and the heavily motorised German forces which were necessary for deep penetration into Poland could not be used. In a severe winter, it would be possible to undertake certain military operations, but the weather conditions would make the emergency landing places and the usual aerodromes unusable. If Germany used these aerodromes the flying distances would be much prolonged, more petrol would be consumed and a considerable less weight of bombs could be carried. It was therefore necessary that within the shortest time, Poland should clearly state her intentions, and no further provocation should be endured by Germany. If these provocations were just allowed to pass, the affair would be prolonged until October when tanks and aircraft could not be used. The Polish General Staff knew these climatic conditions and their effect upon the German forces and therefore Poland was playing for time. The Führer had therefore come to two definite conclusions , 1) in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately attack, 2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her political intention, she must be forced to do so. It should not be forgotten that the test of nerves which the Poles had begun by means of continual instances of provocation had not lasted for three months. Any sign of giving way would, in view of the Slav mentality, bring a violent reaction of over-confidence on the part of the Poles. Surrender would not, in any way strengthen the German position but would be regarded by every other country as a sign of weakness. If the Western Democracies had already decided to move against the Axis, they would not in any case wait for three or four years before carrying out their plan and attack only at a time when the Axis Powers had completed their necessary preparations, but they would pass the earlier conflict. If, however, they had not yet come to a decision in the matter (and the Führer thought that in the state of their armaments they had not come to this decision), the best way of preventing them would be to deal with the Polish matter quickly. In general, however, success by one of the Axis partners, not only strategical but also phycholo-gical strengthening of the other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue. Italy carried through a number of successful operations in Abyssinia, Spain and Albania and each time against the wishes of the Democratic Entente. These individual actions have not only strengthened Italian local interests but had also reinforced her general position, the same was the case with German actions in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Here also not only had German local interest been strengthened but the general position had been re-inforced. The Axis had thereby won considerable victories. If one were to consider what would have happened if these individual operations had not been successful and to ask what the position of Germany would then have been, one reached a similar conclusion. The strengthening of the Axis by these individual operations was of the greatest importance for the unavoidable clash with the Western Powers. As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not

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exist further in the world through lack of space, not only was there no more space but existing space was completely blockaded by its present possessors, they sat like misers with their heaps of gold and deluded themselves about their riches. The Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the world and would not regard Germany and Italy as their class. This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life and death business. It could only be settled by a life and death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet more easily because their interests did not clash on any point. The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy already was the dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Führer said that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck had recognised it and had said as much in his well-known letter to Manzzini. The interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there never could be a conflict between them. Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in yesterday's conversations were settled, Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the west. The Führer said that Poland must be struck down so t. for (?50) years long she was incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the west could be settled. Ciano thanked the Führer for his extremely clear explanation of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite information on one point in order that the Duce might have all the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no decision because the Führer believed that the conflict with Poland could be localised on the basis of long experience. He (Ciano) quite saw that so far the Führer had always been right in his judgment of the position. If, however, Mussolini had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of precaution and therefore Ciano would put the following question:-

The Führer had mentioned two conditions under which he would take Poland 1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation and 2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The first of these conditions depended on the decision of the Führer and German reaction could follow it in a moment. The second condition required certain decisions as to times. Ciano therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realised that this date depended upon climatic conditions.

The Führer answered that the decision of Poland must be made clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the decisive part of military operations against Poland could be carried out within a period of 14 days and the final liquidation would need another 4 weeks, it could be finished at the end of September or the beginning of October these could be regarded as the dates. It followed therefore that the last dates on which he could begin to take action was the end of August. Finally Führer assured Ciano that since his youth, he had favoured German-Italian co-operation and that no other view was expressed in his books. He had always thought that Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaborati since there were no conflicts of interests between them. He was personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in history; that he could b this man's friend was for him a matter of great personal satisfaction and if the hour of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of the Duce.

TC 32

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO NORWAY OF OCTOBER 6, 1939

Ref: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Vol. VII, I, p.350

2. Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the northern States, neither has she any today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression pacts by Germany and have both refused them solely because they do not feel themselves threatened in any way.

TC 37

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO BELGIUM OF OCTOBER 6, 1939.

Ref: Dokumente der deutschen Politik Vol. VII, I, p. 351.

5. Belgium.

Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state I tried to create friendly relations with Belgium I renounced any revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not made any demands which would in any way be likely to be considered in Belgium as a threat.

TC 41

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO THE NETHERLANDS OF OCTOBER 6, 1939.

Ref: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Vol. VII, I p. 351.

4. Holland.

The new Reich has endeavoured to continue the traditional friendship with Holland. It has not taken over any existing differences between the two countries and has not created any new ones.

TC 43 - vide p. 80

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA OF OCTOBER 6, 1939

Ref: Dokumente der deutschen Politik, Vol. VII, I, p. 352.

7. Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that, from now on, the frontier with this country would also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in peace and friendship with her.

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2719 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

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DOCUMENTS OF THE ORIGIN OF WAR

No. 337

The State Secretary of the German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Representatives

Order

(Translation)
Berlin, 28 April 1938

As a consequence of the re-union of Austria with the Reich, we have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded by us as final and inviolable. On this point the following special declarations have been made:-

1. Italy

The Fuehrer and Chancellor in his Reichstag Speech of 13 March 1938 referred to the letter he had addressed to Signor Mussolini on 11 March 1938, and pointed out that he had assured Signor Mussolini in it "that in the German attitude towards Italy after this event not only will there be no change, but Germany will recognize the then existing frontiers with Italy as final, as she does the frontiers with France."

In the same Reichstag Speech the Fuehrer also made the following declarations: "We know what Mussolini's attitude has meant for Germany in these days. The consolidation of relations between Italy and Germany, if such a thing was still possible, is now an established fact. What was a bond based on our common political outlook and interests has become for us Germans as indissoluble friendship. For us, the territory and the frontiers of this our friend are inviolable. I repeat that I shall never forget this attitude of Mussolini's! I want the Italian people to know that my word is backed by the German nation!"

2. Switzerland

On 14 March the German Minister at Berne reminded Federal Councillor Motta of the assurance made respecting the independence and inviolability of Switzerland which, when assuming office, the Minister had been empowered by the Fuehrer and Chancellor to transmit to Herr Motta. In effect these assurances amounted to a repetition of the well-known declaration by the Fuehrer and Chancellor, made to Herr Schulthess, former Federal Councillor, on 23 February 1937, the gist of which is contained in the sentence: "Come what come may, we shall always respect Switzerland's inviolability and neutrality." On 15 March, the Swiss Government brought these statements made to Herr Motta by the German Minister to the knowledge of the Swiss Press, which then published them throughout, though in some cases not quite accurately.

3. Yugoslavia

The Yugoslav Governemnt have been informed by authoritative German quarters that German policy has no aims beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in any case remain untouched. In his speech made at Graz on 3 April, the Fuehrer and Chancellor stated that, in regard to the re-union of Austria, Yugoslavia and Hungary had adopted the same attitude as Italy. We were happy to have frontiers there which relieved us of all anxiety about providing military protection for them.

The Hungarian Government have been informed by our Minister at Budapest that the declarations made to Italy, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland concerning the new frontiers were, of course, equally valid for the new German-Hungarian frontier. In his speech made before the Foreign Committees of the House of Deputies and the Upper House, on 23 March, K. Kanya, the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointed out, with our concurrence, that the Government of the Reich had allowed no doubt whatever to remain that they considered the present German-Hungarian frontier just as inviolable as the German frontiers with Yugoslavia, Italy and Switzerland.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2719 PS

17 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, PFC, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 2719 PS.

ERNTS M. COHN
PFC, 33925738

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Exhibit U.S.A. 114
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

T.C.92

EXTRACT FROM
THE FÜHRER'S ADDRESS
ON THE OCCASION OF
THE DINNER IN HONOUR OF THE PRINCE REGENT OF YUGOSLAVIA
ON JUNE 1ST, 1939

... The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst of the tragic confusion of the world war. The German soldier then learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave opponent. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This mutual respect finds confirmation in common political, cultural and economic interests. We therefore look upon your Royal Highness's present visit as a living proof of the accuracy of our view, and at the same time on that account we derive from it the hope that German-Yugoslav friendship may continue further to develop in the future and to grow ever closer.

In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly exchange of views which, and of this I am convinced, in this sense can only be fruitful to our two peoples and States. I believe this all the more because a firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to Yugoslavia, now that, owing to historical events, we have become neighbours with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries, but can also represent an element of calm to our nerve-wracked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work....

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS

AGGRESSION AGAINST GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA

Prosecution Reference (Tribunal Exhibit no.)	Date	Description	Reference to German publication containing text.
P.S.2719 ( )	29 April 1938	German assurance to Yugoslavia. Official announcement by German Foreign Office.	Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges Auswartiges Amt. 1939, nr. 2, page 324.
T.C.92 ( )	1 June 1939	Extract from Hitler's address at dinner for Prince Regent of Yugoslavia.	Dokumente zum Konflikt mit Jugoslawien und Griechenland, Berlin, 1941, page 74.
T.C.43 ( )	6 October 1939	German assurance to Yugoslavia. Extract from speech by Hitler to Reichstag.	D.d.D.P., vol. 7, part 1, page 352.
T.C.77 ( )	12 August 1939	Memorandum of conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano.	
P.S.2762 ( )	Undated (probably early November 1940)	Letter from Hitler to Mussolini.	
P.S.444 ( )	12 November 1940	Directive No. 18 by Hitler.	
P.S.1541 ( )	13 December 1940	Directive No. 20 by Hitler.	
P.S.448 ( )	11 January 1941	Directive No. 22 by Hitler.	
C.134 ( )	21 January 1941	Letter from Jodl enclosing memorandum on conference between German and Italian Generals on 19 January and subsequent speech by Hitler on 20 January 1941.	
P.S.1746 ( )	8 February 1941	Conference between German and Bulgarian Generals.	
	27 March 1941	Speech by Hitler to German High Command on situation in Yugoslavia.	
	28 March 1941	Plan for invasion of Yugoslavia	
C.59	19 February 1941	Order signed by Warlimont for execution of operation "Marita".	

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C.167 ( )	18 March 1941	Report by Raeder on interview with Hitler.	
P.S.2450 ( )	25 March 1941	Two letters from Ribbentrop to Prime Minister of Yugoslavia.	Dokumente zum Konflikt mit Jugoslawien und Griechenland, Berlin 1941, page 118.
P.S.2765 ( )	25 March 1941	Extract from notes of conference between Hitler and Ciano in Vienna.	
C.127 ( )	27 March 1941	Extract from Directive No. 25 by Hitler.	
P.S.1835 ( )	28 March 1941	Letter from Hitler to Mussolini	
R.95 ( )	30 March 1941	Army Order signed by von Brauchitsch.	
T.C.93 ( )	6 April 1941	Extract from proclamation of the Führer to the German people.	Dokumente zum Konflikt mit Jugoslawien und Griechenland, Berlin, 1941, page 2.
L.172 ( )	7 November 1943	Lectures by Jodl at Munich	

Exhibit G. B. 126
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1835 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1154-0044

Urgent. To Ambassador:

Fuehrer and RM request you immediately to transmit the following letter by Fuehrer to Duce.

Report execution.

Berlin, 28.3.41. 0,5 =

Duce, events force me to give you, Duce by, this the quickest means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences which may result from it.

1.) From the beginning, I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at all justified, as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous and she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns, on our enormous front.

2.) For this reason, I've done everything and honestly endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by mutual interests. Unfortunately, these endeavors did not meet with success, or they were begun too late to produce any definite result. Today's reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia.

3.) I don't consider this situation as being catastrophic but nevertheless a difficult one, and we, on our part, must avoid any mistake if we do not want, in the end, to endanger our whole position.

4.) Therefore, I have already arranged for all necessary measures in order to meet a critical development with necessary military means. The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few days. I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the most important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available forces.

These measures should not be considered as designed for a long period of time but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at least fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising.

I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and with utmost speed.

5.) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only personalities who necessarily must be notified, know anything about them. These measures will completely lose their value should they become known.

6.) Today I called in the Bulgarian and the Hungarian ministers and outlined to them my thoughts on the situation and, with view to military developments, tried to arouse their interest by explaining to both of them, the negative and positive effects which would arise for them in this case. Since without the aid of Hungary and Bulgaria, operations, Duce, cannot develop with the swiftness which might be necessary under the circumstances.

If possible in the course of tomorrow, I will inform you, Duce, more thoroughly about all this.

7.) Therefore, General von Rintelen will report to you, Duce, tomorrow if the weather is suitable for flying and will tell you the military dispositions which are being prepared, and which we shall carry out.

Duce, should secrecy be observed as to these measures, then in case action on our part should become necessary, I have no doubt that we will both achieve a success no less than the success in Norway a year ago. This is my unshakable conviction.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1835 PS
Continued

Accept my heartfelt and friendly greetings. Yours.

/Signed/ Adolf Hitler

End of letter, Bureau of Minister.

With the directive that Ambassador Mackensen transmit this letter tonight to Duce.

Hewel 27.3.41 2400

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1835 PS

10 November 1945

I, E. GLAZIER, P/O, U.S.N.R.N.S. 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1835 PS.

E. GLAZIER,
P/O/ U.S.N.R.N.S.
37371

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Exhibit GB 127
Filed Dec. 7, 1945

TRANSLATION. R95.

COPY.

High Command of the Army

General staff of the Army Operations div. (I)

Ref: 540/41 Top Secret. Gen. Staff matter.

H.Q., High Command of the Army.

30 March 1941.

Operational directions for "Operation 25"

and additional directions for "Marita".

1) Owing to the change in the political situation in the Balkans, brought about by the Yugoslav military coup d'état, Yugoslavia must be regarded as an enemy country, even if at first they make declaration of loyalty.

The Führer and Supreme Commander has therefore decided to smash Yugoslavia as quickly as possible.

The operation bears the code-name "Operation 25".

2) Intentions of the High Command of the Army are to invade Yugoslavia by a concentric movement from the zone Klagenfurt-Graz and around N. Kanizsa on the one hand (2nd Army) and from the Sofia zone on the other (12th Army) in the general direction Belgrade and South thereof and to beat and destroy the Yugoslav Armed Forces; it is further intended to take over the Southern part of Yugoslavia as soon as possible in order to establish contact with the Italian Army groups in Albania and so as to have a basis for the continuance of the German-Italian offensive against Greece.

The early resumption of traffic on the Danube and the occupation of the Bor copper-mines are of importance to our war economy.

3) Enemy Dispositions:

The enemy can be expected to react defensively in Northern Yugoslavia. Racial antipathies may even induce the Yugoslav Command to restrict itself to the defence of Serbia proper. In that case numerous and extensive obstacles can be expected in the Slovenian and Croatian parts of the country.

In Southern Yugoslavia the enemy can be expected to defend his Eastern frontier by making extensive use of obstacles and at the same time to endeavour to protect his rear by invading Albania in collaboration with Greek and British forces.

Once the German attack has disrupted the Yugoslav defences by occupying the principal communication roads, the Yugoslav forces can be expected to put up a stiff defence in the mountainous territory and to fight with determination as long as their ammunition and provisions last. The nationality problem may have a decisive influence on the duration and stubborness of their resistance.

For details of enemy dispositions, see enclosure No. 1.

4) Orders issued concerning operations against Greece remain valid, including the taking of the North Aegean islands; the Führer has, however, reserved himself the right to order the taking of Lemnos. Protection of the Turkish frontier has been entrusted to the Bulgars for the time being. An armoured division will be made available as reserve.

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5) Time-table of Operations:

a) On April 5th, as soon as Air Force units in sufficient strength are assembled and the weather permits, air attack on Yugoslav ground formations and against Belgrade in continuous day and night attacks.

Simultaneous commencement of attack (this must in no circumstances be premature) by the 12th Army (excluding Northern wing, i.e. Panzer Grenadier Regt. No. 1) against Yugoslavia and Greece.

Army H.Q. must be enabled to defer the air attack 10 hours before the time for which it is fixed, if weather conditions are unfavourable.

8) Participation of other States:

a) Italian Participation:

The task of the 2nd Italian Army operating to the East of Triest will be to tie down opposing enemy forces. Thereafter, as soon as the progress made by the 2nd Army disrupts the enemy front opposite the 2nd Italian Army, the latter will join the 2nd Army's push towards the South-East. Army boundaries will subsequently be laid down.

On the Greek-Albanian front the Italians will take up defensive positions and will block and defend the frontier at the most important crossings from Albania into Yugoslavia at Skutari, Kukes, Debar and Struge.

Liaison Officers will be provided:
by 12th Army to the Italian Army Group in Albania (already instructed)
by 2nd Army to 2nd Italian Army (instructions follow)

b) Hungarian Participation:

Hungary will participate in the operations against Yugoslavia and advance into the zone North of the rivers Sava and Danube as far as their confluence with the river Tisa.

The Royal Hungarian Army Command intends to provide at their frontiers for that purpose by April 14th:

The 3rd Army, consisting of 3 brigades to start with, in the territory to the West of the river Danube,
The 2nd Army, consisting of 12 brigades, in the territory between the rivers Danube and Tisa,
One brigade under 2nd Army East of the river Tisa.

The Royal Hungarian Army Command has agreed to its subordination under Army High Command for the operations intended. Army High Command will appoint a Plenipotentiary General Staff Officer as Liaison Officer to the Royal Hungarian Army Command.

Boundary Lines:

c) Rumanian Participation:

No active Rumanian participation in the operations against Yugoslavia is to be expected. Rumania will, however, introduce reinforced frontier protection on her frontiers. The main task of Rumania remains protection against Russia.

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d) Bulgarian Participation:

Should Bulgarian forces participate actively in operations against Yugoslavia, H.Q. 12th Army will make the necessary agreements with the Bulgarian Army Command. Bulgarian forces operating against Yugoslavia will be subordinate to German Commands.

9. Air Force Participation:

No air-attacks are to be carried out on Croatian territory, unless such attacks are aimed at Yugoslav military formations in that territory.

Army co-operation will work out as follows:

H.Q. 12th Army with VIII Air Corps.

H.Q. 2nd Army with 4th Air Fleet.

C-in-C Air Force will arrange for sufficient A.A. protection for Graz, Klagenfurt, Villach and Leoben, as well as Vienna.

(signed) von Brauchitsch.

COPY OF EXTRACTS.

Int. Div. Foreign Armies, East

Enclosure 1 to: High Command of the Army/Army General Staff/Op. Div.(I) Reference 540/42 Top Secret, Gen. Staff matter dated 30 March 1941.

Details of enemy dispositions.

1) Total strength.

After a general mobilization, Yugoslavia will have the following forces available:

24 Inf. Divs., of which 11 Reserve divs.
20 Inf. brigades (Mixed. Active and Reserve troops).
3 Cav. divs (Active).
3 Cav. brigades (Reserve)
1 Fortress div. (Cattaro)
1 Fortress brigade (Sibenik)

In addition to above are available:

Approx. 20 batallions garrison troops for the fortifications on the Northern frontier (against Germany and Hungary).
10 frontier protection regts.

Yugoslavia does not possess any large motorized or armoured formations.

The forces are organized into Armies (1st to 5th Army and the Coastal Army). The 7th Army is in formation on the Northern frontier.

At present all Active formations have been fully mobilized, whilst most of the Reserve formations are still in course of mobilization.

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General mobilization was publicly announced over the broadcasting system on March 28th.

The preparations for the waging of a guerilla war are noticeable. For that purpose Yugoslav para-military organizations (amongst others the Sokols and Chetniks) have been specially trained. They have been armed to Infantry scale, but without heavy arms.

3) Application of enemy effectiveness:

Military training is out of date. In particular training under operational conditions and co-operation between arms on a high level have been very much neglected. The Serbian mountain formations are the best trained troops.

The Officers cadre is composed of super-annuated generals, a general staff which has been schematically trained on French lines, and unit Officers who possess military talents, but are badly led.

The rank and file are good in individual combat. They are courageous, tough and modest in their requirements, but they are very susceptible to attacks with heavy arms and from the air.

The Airforce is as yet little developed (at present approx. 300 operational planes and 700 obsolete models are available). Only a few formations are in existence.

To sum up: It can be stated that the Yugoslav Army can wage an offensiv war at most against an equal opponent. The Yugoslav, especially the Serbian soldier will fight courageously, and frequently engage in close combat.

However, the Yugoslav Army will quickly succumb to the German forces.

Enclosure 2 to: High Command of the Army/
Army Gen. Staff/Op. div.
(I) Reference 540/41
Top Secret, General Staff matter.

Order of Battle.

I. 12th Army:

Panzer Grenadier regt. 1
H.Q. XIV mot. Army Corps
" XXXX " " "
" XXXXI" " "
" XI " "
" XXX " "
" L " "
" XVIII mountain Army Corps
2)
5)
9) Panzer div.
11)
16)
60 mot. div.
S.S. " " "Das Reich"

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46)
50)
72)
73) Inf. div.
76)
164)
198)
294)

4)
5) mountain div.
6)

Jaeger regt. "Gross Deutschland"
S.S. Standarte "Adolf Hitler"
Jaeger regt. 125
Regt. "Goering"
and Bulgarian formations.

II. 2nd Army.

H.Q. XXXXVI mot. Army Corps
" LI " "
" LII " "
" XXXXIX mountain Army Corps

8)
14) Panzer div.
16 mot. div.
79)
125)
132) inf. div.
169)
183)
197)
1 mountain div.

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Part 1
4.B.114

T.C.93

EXTRACT FROM
PROCLAMATION OF THE FUHRER TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE
6 APRIL 1941

... From the beginning of the struggle it has been England's steadfast endeavour to make the Balkans a theatre of war. British diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War, succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to her, and then finally in misusing her for Britain's purposes.

The documents published today afford a glimpse of a practice which, in accordance with very old British recipes, is a constant attempt to induce others to fight and bleed for British interests.

In the face of this I have always emphasised that -

(1) The German people have no antagonism to the Greek people, but that
(2) We shall never, as in the World War, tolerate a Power establishing itself on Greek territory with the object, at a given time, of being able to advance thence from the south-east into German living space. We have swept the northern flank free of the English: we are resolved not to tolerate such a threat in the south!

In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe, it has been my endeavour, since the day of my assumption of power, above all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugoslavia. I have consciously put out of mind everything that once took place between Germany and Serbia. I have not only offered the Serbian people the hand of the German people, but, in addition, have made efforts as an honest broker to assist in bridging all difficulties which existed between the Yugoslav State and various nations allied to Germany. ...

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vide U.S.A. 34

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CONFIDENTIAL.

THE STRATEGIC POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 5TH YEAR OF WAR.

A lecture delivered by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces on the 7th November, 1943 at MUNICH to the Reich and Gau- Leaders.

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iginal

The Strategic Position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War

Lecture
by the Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces to
the Reichs - and Gau- leaders, delivered
in MUNICH on 7 Nov 1943.

Introduction

Reichs leader BORMANN has requested me to give you a review to-day of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.

I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I untertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say what will be, but it is necessary to say openly what is. No-one - the FUEHRER has ordered - may know more or be told more than he needs for
2 own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your GAUS, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours concentrate that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or - as they call it - a political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these gaus are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncoloured account of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by force of arms but by the will to resist of the whole people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at
3. home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected but - through the cowardice of these criminal traitors - a fate a thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people.

I

4 The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and in that of Russia - these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts :

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I A review of the most important questions of development up to the present.

II Consideration of the present situation.

III The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.

In view of my position as military adviser to the Führer I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way be giving expression only to one side of events.

6. I. Review

1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realise what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight ("WEHRWILLEN"), in nurturing fighting strength ("WEHRKRAFT") and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small REICHSWEHR would never have been able to cope wi this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indee what the Fuhrer aimed at - and has so happily been successful in bringing about - was the fusion of these two forces.

7. 2. The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereignty ("WEHRHOHEIT") (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and re-armament with special emphasis being l on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.

3. The Austrian "Anschluss", in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavourable that she was bound to fall a victi to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.

8. This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the WEST WALL, which in contra-distinction to the MAGINOT Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover or an active policy in the EAST.

4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.

9. 5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland - in itself unavoidable - was favourably selected or not. The answer to this all the less in doubt since the opponent - after all not inconsiderable/in [illegible] collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the courses taken by the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said

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beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means, i.e., the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Greater Germany.

e 10. 6. The main effect of this success was however that we now had no opponent in the EAST and that in view of the agreements with Russia the t front problem might be regarded as for the time being solved.

7. As a result of all this the point of gravity in the conduct of the war naturally shifted to the WEST where the most urgent task was clearly defined as the protection of the RUHR area from the invasion of Holland by the British and French. Even before the Polish campaign had been concluded the FUHRER had already decided upon an attack against this enemy the aim of which could only be complete subjection of the opponent. The circumstance that this decision was not carried out - as originally planned - i.e. in the late autumn of 1939 - was mainly due to weather conditions but in part also influenced by our situation with regard to armaments.

11. 8. In the meantime however we were confronted by yet another proble which must be settled promptly: the occupation of Norway and Denmark. Th point here lay in opening up a theatre of War which while it lay outside the zone of immediate danger yet possessed two-fold importance from the point of view of our general conduct of the war. In the first place ther was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the NORTH would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes, Secondly, it was realisation of our own maritime necessities which made i imperative for us to secure for ourselves free access to the ATLANTIC by number of air and naval support points, here too, therefore, defensive an offensive requirements combined toform an indissoluble whole.

The course and conclusion of this campaign are known. In the main it was completed in such good time that it was possible to start upon the campaign in the WEST with the setting in of the most favourable season of the year, in May 1940.

12. 9. The decisive success of this campaign improved our position in the best possible way. We gained possession not only of the French potential of armaments - destined to do us important service in the furth course of the war - but above all the entire ATLANTIC Coast fell into our hands with its naval ports and air support points Direct threat to the British Motherland had by this means become possible.

The question now arose whether or not we should carry the war int England by a landing on the grand scale. Furthermore - in view of the possible eventuality of the USA entering the war - it was necessary to take into consideration the occupation of a number of advanced
13. support points in the ATLANTIC (for instance, Iceland and the AZORES on which in the meantime the enemy had laid his hand). From these islands we should be able both to carry on particularly effectively the fight against British supplies and to defend the territory of Europe in exactly the same way as Japan now holds Greater East Asia secure by means of its island advanced bases in the Pacific. However, very wisely the FUHRER refrained from adopting these objectives. Not alone their initial execution but the subsequent maintenance of communications by sea would have involved a measure of strength which our naval and air equipment coul not have provided permanently.

10. Instead of these considerations the winter of 1940/41. provided another opportunity of combating England. Although outwardly our action only took the form of aid to our Italian Ally, yet ultimately the point at issue was British command of the seas in the Mediterranean which inits turn represented a heavy menace to the Southern flank of the European continent.

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In a measure as the weakness and failure of Italy became more and more manifest, as North Africa became more and more a German theatre 14 of War. Employing our forces in this way - incidentally, no great force was involved - appeared to be all the more justified since by this means strong British land, sea, and air forces, and a very considerable tonnage in the way of sea-transport would be kept tied down, away from German "living space".

11. What was however less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in consequence of the 'extra-turn' of the Italians against Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part which - taking a long view of the matter - would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the NORTH was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that Country.

15 12 Parallel with all these developments realisation was steadily gr of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East - that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the FUHRER himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position made it at all possible.

13 Following on the interlude of the overthrow in Yugoslavia, the Balkan campaign which followed this, and our occupation of CRETE, this decision was translated into action. If put into effect at all, it had of necessity to take us deep into Russian territory - a circumstance entailing dangers to an extent not yet encountered in our previous campaigns.

16 14. In spite of the fact that we were not able either in 1941 nor in 1942 completely to annihilate the enemy's fighting forces and thereby to force Russia to her knees, yet we can definitely claim it as a positive result that the Bolshevist danger has been driven back far from our own frontiers.

If to-day, in view of the repeated and prolonged setbacks of the year 1943, the question comes up again and again, whether we had not thoroughly under-estimated the strength of the Bolshevik opponent, the answer to this question in regard to the execution of individual part-operations, may certainly be said to be 'Yes'. But as regards the decision to attack as a whole and that of holding on to this decision for a long as possible there can be no doubts. As in politics so in the conduct of war - the issue is not merely one of arithmetical sums, and one of the most important lessons taught by war is that correct estimation of the opponent is one of the hardest of all hard tasks, and that even when everything has been correctly summed up, there 17 still remains much that is imponderable and only becomes clear in the course of the battle itself.

One clarification of the situation is however to be perceived in that, as a result of our advance into the dark unknown which is Russia, we have taken the measure not only of the strength in personnel involved but also of the standard of equipment which has forced us in our turn to institute a state of total warfare and a technical counter-blast such as left to ourselves we were hardly likely to have produced. One can only think with a shudder of what would have happened if we had adopted a waiting attitude in the fact of this danger and, sooner or later, had been taken by it by surprise.

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15. Within the framework of this short sketch of the sweep of our strategy all that remains to mention is the occupation of TUNIS effected as a counter-measure to the landing of Anglo-American forces on the NORTH and WEST coasts of French North Africa, the rapid loss again of which position is probably specially likely to evoke doubt in the correctness of our wider strategy.

Taking it all in all, however, fighting along the periphery has built up for us a capital sum of space which we are now living upon.

e 19. In recapitulation, a brief summary of the course of the great tactical events up to the autumn of 1943:

The first two years of war saw Germany and its later Allies running a victorious course almost unparalleled in history. The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, in North Africa, in the Balkans, and the attack on Russia as far as the DONETZ, up to the gates of MOSCOW and up to the VOLKHOV created a wide forefield for the defence of Europe and as a result of the occupation and making safe of rich areas of raw materials and food, provided the premises for a long war. Superior leadership, better employment of the modern means of war, a superior air arm and the exceptionally high fighting value and morale of our troops faced by opponents inferior on each of these counts have produced these successes. Nevertheless, during this period of the war, in which our superiority on land was undisputed and our superiority in the air was to make good, at all events in the coastal districts, our hopeless inferiority at sea, in our last grasp at the palm of victory success has
e 20. eluded us. The landing in England, prepared for down to the smallest detail but with improvised transport resources only, could not be dared while the British Air arm had not been completely beaten. And this we were not able to do, just as we have not been able completely to shat the Soviet Armed Forces. Later generations will not be able to reproac with not having dared the utmost and spared no effort to achieve these aims which would have decided the war.

But no one could take it upon himself to allow the German air arm to bleed to death in the Battle of Britain in view of the struggle which lay before us against Soviet Russia.

In the EAST however the natural catastrophe of the winter of 194 imposed an imperative halt on even the sternest resolution.

(Passage struck out)

Our third objective, that of drawing Spain into the war on our side and thereby creating the possibility of seizing GIBRALTAR, was wrecked by the resistance of the Spanish or, better say, Jesuit Foreign Minister, SERANO SUNJER.

e 21 It therefore became clear that we could no longer count upon an early end to the war, but that it would be hard and difficult and confront the whole nation with great hardships +.

After the first set-backs on the Eastern front and in the North African theatre of war in the winter of 1943, the Reich and its Allies once again gathered together all their strength in order to defeat this

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+ For - says CLAUSEWITZ - every attack which does not lead either to an armistice or to peace must of necessity end in defence.

692.

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Eastern opponent finally by a new assault and to deprive the British of their Egyptian base of operations. The great operation against the CAUCASUS and the DELTA of the NILE failed, however, owing to insufficient strength and inddequate supplies. For the first time our Western opponents showed themselves to be superior both on the technical side and numerically in the air over the Mediterranean. The Soviet Russian Command also continued to stabilise the front at STALINGRAD and before the CAUCASUS, and after that in wintertime using newly-formed strong reserves continued to break-through the petrified over-extended fronts on the VOLGA and along the DON - largely occupied moreover by the troops
e 22 of our Allies. The 6th Army, consisting of the best German formations, inadequately supplied and exposed to the storms of winter, succumbed to enemy superiority.

Similarly, the Western Powers were able to bring together in Egypt a concentration of land, sea and air forces which held us up at the very gates of Egypt and after the battle of EL ALAMEIN forced us to retreat, and finally, following on the landing of strong Anglo-American armies in French North Africa, to surrender the entire African position. Again some of the best German divisions fell a victim to the stranglehold of a superior enemy air force on our supplies by sea, although not before they had won for us a certain gain in time which was worth every sacrifice.

At the end of the winter fighting of 1942/43 and after the loss of the African Army the armed forces of Germany and her Allies were strained to the utmost. It proved possible to re-form the 5th Armoured Army and the 6th Army - but four allied armies were lost for good.

The tactical reserves in the EAST would, it is true be exceptionally well equipped, but their numbers would not longer be increased to such a
e 23 pitch as to make it possible to envisage any extensive operations. Gone was the great mobility of the Army and excepting on the Russian theatre of war, gone also our superiority in the air. The superior economic strength of our opponents and their greater reservoir of manpower, concentrated to form a point of gravity against Europe, was beginning to tell. The complete failure of Italy in all domains and the absence of any munitions production worthy of the name among our other Allies could not be adequately compensated by the tremendous efforts made by Germany.

Of necessity therefore the initiative was bound to pass over to the opposing side and the Reich, and the European nations fighting at Germany's side, to go over to the defensive.

So when the positions pushed out beyond the European front to the SOUTH had been taken by the enemy, in July 1943, the enemy attack started: in the EAST to regain the territories lost there and in the SOUTH against Fortress Europe proper at its weakest point. In the meantime
e 24 the air arms of the Anglo-Americans had already begun the grand assault on the production hearths and morale of our people at home.

In the Far East Japan's struggle has developed on much the same lines, with the difference, however, that the Japanese had pushed their advanced positions very much further away from the Motherland proper and Anglo-Saxons did not here undertake any attacks on a large-scale for the reason that they had directed their point of gravity against Europe.

e 25

II

It was at this stage of the war thatthe Italian betrayal took place. Its main features will be known to you from what appeared in the press, Actually it was even more dramatic than the newspapers showed. For the Supreme Command it was perhaps one of the hardest problems which it had as yet had to master. That the removal and arrest of the DUCE could not end otherwise than by the defection of Italy was completely clear to the FUEHRER from the first, although many politically less well-trained eyes thought to see in it rather an improvement in our position in the Mediterranean and our co-operation with the Italians. There were many personages at this time who failed to understand the Fuhrer's GHQ in its political and military actions. For these were directed towards

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overthrowing the new Government and liberating the DUCE. Only the smallest possible circle might know of this. On the military side in the meantime everything was to be done to stop enemy penetration of the Southern front as far SOUTH as possible, i.e. on SICILY.

26. That the enemy would bring this point of gravity to bear on some point further WEST in the Mediterranean - of that there was not the slightest doubt; the distribution of his shipping and landing space made this clear. Where however would this point be? On SARDINIA, on CORSICA, in APULIA, in CALABRIA, or - if the thesis of betrayal were true - why not in ROME itself, or near LEGHORN or GENOA? If he did not do this, then our job was to hold as much of Italy as possible in orde not to let the base of the enemy succeed in landing in North Italy, then all the German formations in Central and Southern Italy would be lost. Moreover no grounds must be given which might serve the Italians as a
27 moral prdtext for their betrayal, or by premature hostile action to commit the betrayal ourselves. In the meantime the traitors simply oozed with amiability and assurances of faith, and even got as far as to make some of officers who came into contact with them daily doubtful of the truth of th betrayal-hypothesis. This was nothing to be wondered at, for to the German officers such depths of infamy were imply incomprehensible.

The situation became more and more difficult. It was perhaps the only time in this war when at times I myself hardly knew what I should suggest to the FUHRER. The measures to be taken in the event of open betrayal had been decided in every detail. The watchword "Axis" would set them in motion. In the meantime however all the divisions, which the FUHRER at once caused to be moved from the WEST to Upper Italy, were operatively idle there - and that at a time when the EAST front, subjected to severe assault, was begging for reserves more urgently than ever.

28. How much meanwhile we had been able to find out through our troops and through the bordering GAU'S - keen as sleuth-hounds on the track of It machinations - in the matter of manifestly hostile actions and preparation is known to you all. However somehow or other the Italians explained it all way, either as a misunderstanding or with excuses.

In this insupportable position the FUHRER agreed to slash through the Gordian knot by a political and military ultimatum. Then on the morning of the 7 September the enemy landing fleet appeared at SALERNO and the afternoon of September 8th news of the Italian capitulation flew throu the ether. Even now however, at the last moment, the freedom of action of the Command was still held up: the Italians refused to admit the authenticity of the wireless message. The password itself therefore would not be given but only the 'stand-by' for the troops, until at last at 19.15 this most monstrous of all betrayals in history was confirmed by the Italian political authorities themselves. What followed was both a drama and a tragedy. Only at a later date will it be possible gather together and set forth all the grotesque details. The more disillusioned the troops and the German Command, the harder the reaction.

General Outcome :

Appendix

(Numbered)

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According to my experience, there is yet another anxiety stalking the land. It concerns the morale of our own Allies and the fear that yet other, as yet meutral states, might join the ranks of our enemies. At this point of course, I enter upon the ticklish question of foreign policy which is not my business and which I will traverse/as speedily as possible.

Of the neutral countries, we are not loved by Sweden and Switzerland. The latter is surrounded, of no danger to us from the military point of view, and will not harm us. She lives on our bounty and we benefit from her.

The same does not apply to Sweden In the last few years she has been arming hard, and possesses 12 - 14 Infantry divisions, 3 - 4 armoured brigades, and in addition a few cyclist brigades, in all 400,000 men under arms. Sweden sways between fear of Bolshevism and hope of British-American aid. This latter is far away for as long as we in the SKAGERRAK cut off Sweden's contact with England.

Should an enemy landing in Norway or Denmark prove successful, Sweden may become dangerous - but not before.

Spain and Portugal have decided to remain neutral. They have not the necessary strength to defend themselves against England and America. Everything depends therefore on the good will of our Western opponents as to the measure in which they recognise this neutrality. Latest events in Portugal have shown this. I do not believe however that it is in the interest of the ANGLO-SAXONS either for political or militaryreasons to unleash war on the Iberian Peninsula and that is what would undoubtedly happen were Spain to be attacked. Whether the simpler methods of political disintegration which are at present being employed will be successful is doubtful, at all events in the case of Spain.

TURKEY so far has maintained a clear policy of neutrality. Its ideal would have been agreement between England and Germany and consequently reliable security against her traditional enemy : Russia. However, the closer the Soviet Power approaches the Balkans, the more England - in order to win the war - enters into the tow of the Bolshevists, the more difficult the position of Turkey becomes, for against Soviet Russia and England she cannot possibly maintain her neutrality - Attack by surprise on the part of Turkey against the Axis powers is not to be expected. No more likely however is it that England should allow the Dardanelles to pass into the hands of the Soviet Russia and so lose her own safety in the Mediterranean which is her aim. Nevertheless even if England were merely to occupy the Dardanelles, this would at once be regarded by the Soviets as a hostile act. Turkey's future attitude is dominated by this problem of 'Haute Politique'. She is able to maintain her neutrality thanks to the diverging interests of Soviet Russia and the Western Powers. Expansionist plans she has none, not even against BULGARIA.

32.

Our own Allies on the other hand are united and kept at our side by the fear of Bolshevism. That is understandable, for no people fights for another but only for its own existence.

Concerning the forces internal morale of Finland and Bulgaria there can be no doubt.

Roumania contains two worlds, the rigorous policy faithful to the alliance with us looks two ways.+ We must be clear with ourselves as to that.

+ Translator's note : JODL says literally : "stands on 2 eyes".

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In Hungary, as a feudal state on the old pattern, social contrasts are still present in their most acute form. The country is therefore particularly liable to infection with the Communist idea. In no city in Europe however does this fact appear to be less recognised than in BUDAPEST. In that city a dissolute and strongly JUDAIFIED society strate is living and dancing on a volcano. However in contra distinction to Italy, here the main mass of the officer caste at least has recognised the danger. For the present at all events for Hungary there is no political way out.

Japan : There a heroic people is fighting for its existence just as we are. From the political-strategic point of view a great gap yawns in the Far East in the clear line of the fronts. ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL want Russia to join in the fight against Japan. We ourselves, from the purely military point of view, would be glad to see the Manchurian Armies cross the AMUR or advance against VLADIVOSTOK. But on this point both the Asiatic powers stop their ears to the syren songs of the West. The reasons for this do not lie solely in the supplementary military burdens which both States would have to take upon themselves by such a decision, but more probably in their own long-term political considerations. For why should Japan start a war against Russia for as long as can be certain that there will be no American-British air base at VLADIVOSTOK and while on the distant horizon there still looms large a conflict of the Western powers against Soviet Russia?

VI

34 Leaving the slippery ground of politics, I now turn to the problem which confronts the High Command to-day and will confront it in the near future. We are fighting along the inner line, that is, we are in a position to transfer strong forces from one theatre of war to another in a much shorter time. Our great successes in the East in 1917/18 and in Italy in 1917 we owe to able exploitation of the inner line. To-day this tactical advanta e of the inner line is not so marked; at the moment the enemy is so strong on all fronts that in spite of our shorter lines of communication we are scarcely in a position to produce more than local superiority. This state of affairs may change if the Anglo-Saxons take steps to form a second or third front in addition to the Italian. At the present time,
35 however, the hardest task of all of the Command is to distribute its forces throughout the theatre of war as a whole in such a way that we may be sufficiently strong as those points at which the enemy delivers the blow. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that we are not in a position rapidly to reinforce the South-East, or Finland, or Norway, because the necessary technical facilities are not present there. We have won advanced positions in Finland, Norway, Denmark, in the West, in Italy and in the South-East in order to keep the core of the Reich itself alive. The same reasons which compelled us to take these positions also compel us now, at this particular time, when the superior range of the enemy air arm is inflicting grave injury to the centre of the Reich, to maintain them. To do so a certain measure of strength is necessary. That things are getting warm on the East front, must be admitted; however no success gained by the enemy is directly fatal there, with the exception of the loss of the Roumanian oil region. None the less the Command cannot close its eyes to the fact that the brand is now held in readiness at some time or another to start a conflagration in the West which if not extinguished then and there will pass beyond control.

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e 36.

It is at this point the various fronts ceaselessly drag on the nerves and decisions of the FUHRER. STEGEMANN once put this into words as follows : "In war there is always the same conflict : the swing between spending and saving the forces accumulated. This has been and still is a problem not easy to solve. War with its unpredictabilities its intangible dynamics and its fluctuations of luck and chance cannot be determined beforehand. He who expends everything on one throw may later on, as the result of circumstances, be left with empty hands, and he who expends his accumulated forces sparingly may, as the result of circumstances, never come to win the upper hand. Only he who is able to solve this problem is able to master war. One thing however has always been so, namely, that whatever may be done must be done with all one's might if it is to pay. That is the only rule which in war has never failed."

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Where the enemy will strike to obtain that decision, we do not know. He has jumping-off base in the Mediterranean and a jumping-off base in England.

No theatre of war can be weakened below a certain level. Our uttermost efforts can therefore only take the form of creating, in spite of all our manpower problems, new tactical central reserves over and above the necessary minimum of occupying forces. That is now being done (Appendix).

This however brings us to the next difficult problem which always arises in every long war : the interplay and conflict between the need for soldiers at the front and the need for workers at home. Never before has this problem presented itself in so acute a form as in this highly mechanized war. Herewith a few figures (Appendix).

How therefore is the Command to decide? The front needs soldiers and the front needs weapons. Many weapons, and the better weapons the higher the value attached to the life of the fighting man himself.

If we had not the FUHRER at the head with sovereign rights of decision there would be black murder done on this question. One thing however is sure : it is a crime to keep a man able to bear arms working at home if he can be replaced by some other worker or if his work is

e 38

not vital. Fortunately Italy's betrayal has its good side in this question. The flow of military internees and workers from Italy will afford considerable relief in this domain.

This dilemma of man-power shortage has led to the idea of making more thorough use of the man-power reserves in the territories occupied by us. Here right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up together. I believe that in so far as concerns labour, everything has been done that could be done. But where this has not yet been achieved, it appeared to be more favourable politically not to have recourse to measures of compulsion, exchanging for these order and economic aid. In my opinion however the time has now come to take

e 39

steps with remorseless vigour and resolution in Denmark, Holland, France and Belgium also to compel thousands of idlesto carry out the fortification work which is more important than any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been given.

The question of recruiting alien peoples as fighting men should however be examined with the greatest caution and scepticism. There was a time when something in the nature of a neurosis emanated from the East Front with the slogan "Russia can be conquered+) only by Russians".

+) In the typescript the word was typed as 'liberated'. This has been scratched out in favour of 'conquered'.

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Many heads were haunted by the notion of an immense VLASJOV army. At that time we recruited over 160 battalions. Our experiences were good while we were ourselves attacking successfully. They became bad when the position changed for the worse and we were compelled to retreat. To-day only about 100 Eastern battalions are available and hardly one of these is in the East. One Cossack e 40 and one TURKMEN division are at the moment undergoing their test by fire in the South-East. At the moment the Reichfuhrer of the SS is engaged in draining the defensive resources of Estonia and Latvia as well as the Croatian, Moslem and Macedonian manpower supplies.

However, what weighs most heavily to-day on the home front and consequently by reaction on the front line also, are the enemy terror raids from the air on our homes and so on our wives and children. In this respect the war - and this cannot be repeated often enough - has assumed forms solely through the fault of England such as are believed to be no longer possible since the days of the racial and religious wars.

The effect of these terror raids, psychological, moral, and material, is such that they must be relieved if they cannot be made to cease completely. It is true that they - like any other great trouble - has had some good effects. In face of the ruins of one's 41 own possessions all social problems, all enviousness and all the petty impulses of the human soul die down. But this is no consolation for us. Asking too much of our air arm and inability on the technical side to keep pace with the aircraft development and radio location of our enemies have brought us to this pass. The efforts of the FUHRER and the Reichs Marshal will overcome this crisis also. The first beginnin s and first fruits are there. We shall counter the avy and powerful armament of the 4 engined ombers by speed and the annihilating effect of fire at long range. Our enemies have realized this danger and are endeavouring to meet it by destroying the hearths of production. It is enough if the enemy bombers can be made with absolute certainty in all day and night raids to lose 10 - 12% of the aircraft put in. They might perhaps replace this loss on the equipment side, but not in personnel; and above all the morale of the crews, most of whom have no idea for what they are fighting and who among the Americans are mainly materialists, will not hold out against it. I am fully convinced that thanks to our new weapons and technical progress the raids in close squadron formation which alone by means of their bomb carpets have been able to produce so annihilating an effect will not escape their fate.

Nevertheless the greatest hopes of all have been stamped by the military command and the German people in U-boat warfare, and that with every right since within the framework of the general large-scale strategic defensive which we have been forced by the e 42 development of the war and the gradual coming into effect of the superior war potential of our enemies, submarine warfare may be regarded as the only offensive sector of the German command. Here too, in the activities of this weapon, heavy set backs have had to be recorded in the course of the last few months, set backs which have resulted in the successes of the tonnage war no longer being able to keep up with the rate at which the enemy is able to build his merchantmen. The reason for the decline in U-boat successes lies in the anti U-boat defence measures which the opponent has been e 44 driving forward with the uttermost energy, making use for this purpose of wide-scale support by the air arm and new highly efficient detector equipment together with high efficiency bombs and submarine weapons. The present crisis in the German U-boat war is therefore directly traceable to the enemy's air superiority over the Atlantic. This crisis must and will be overcome. The extraordinary importance of the tonnage war remains unassailable, as before. In the past it has afforded the greatest hindrance to all enemy plans of operation and it will continue in the future to present the greatest threat to

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any future developments since all the continuous heavy transportation of men and equipment for the Anglo-Saxon Command and all supply for the armies employed in Europe and for England itself must come by sea. Elimination of the threat presented by the Tonnage-war would inevitably set free a vast enemy war potential for employment at other points.

e 44 On our side measures have been instituted, or are already being developed and driven forward with the almost resolution, with a view to breaking the enemy defence and bringing about a radical improvement in the fighting value of the U-boat.

There is every reason to believe that they will lead to success in the near future and in this way put an end to the present slackening in the U-boat war.

For the rest the C in C of the navy has himself given you an account in greater detail of the general situation in the U-boat war.

e 45

VII

III. The grounds for our confidence in Final Victory.

When at the end of my considerations I come to sum up the general situation in a few words I am bound to describe it quite candidly as difficult, moreover I cannot gloss over the fact that I expect further severe crises. My own attitude towards these prospects I should like to characterise directly by the aphorism from FONTAINE :

> "Great times are always just those when everything seems to be going wrong, when every moment brings the fear: now its all done for. That's when it shows. Courage is good but sticking it out is better. Sticking it out, that's the main thing."

e 46 In particular however our confidence is built up on a period of points of view to be set forth objectively. At the head comes the ethical and moral foundation of our struggle which gives its impress to the general attitude of the German people in the hands of its Command. The force of the revolutionary idea has not only made possible a series of unprecedented successes, it also unables our brave troops to achieve feats in defence and in retreat according to plan such perhaps the Russians but certainly no other people could achieve and which drive off into the realm of Utopia any hope on the part of our opponents for a military breakdown.

As against this moral, political and military tendencies of our opponents by no means from a closed uniformly directed whole. This shows most clearly in the fighting morale of the English and
e 47 Americans whose successes in Africa, Sicily and Italy are solely ascribable to the weakness and treachery of our Italian ally. Where they have met German force in battle, they have shown themselves inferior throughout and gained the advantage only as a result of multiple numerical advantage. This shows particularly clearly from the point of view of their conduct of the war, for according to our ideas it is totally incomprehensible that the Anglo-Americans should have avoided forming the Second Front in the WEST which their Russian allies have been demanding for over two years, and they have by no means extracted from their opportunities in Mediterranean that which according to the true state of affairs and by German standards of activity they might have extracted.

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Well, whatever comes, any further attack by our opponents whether in the NORTH or WEST, in Italy or in the Balkans - will place their readiness for action to a hard test. We ourselves could tell a tale from the struggle in North Africa what supply difficulties can mean and the sacrifices they may entail. And reports of the most various kinds from the camps of our opponents all point in the same direction, showing how difficult the reversion of these conditions is already being found by the enemy.

48 My most profound confidence is however based upon the fact that at the head of Germany there stands a man who by his entire development, his desires and striving can only have been destined by fate to lead our people into a brighter future. In defiance of all views to the contrary I must here testify that he is the soul not only of the political but also of the military conduct of the war and that the force of his willpower and the creative riches of his though animate and hold together the whole of the German Armed Forces, with respect to strategy, organization and munitions of war. Similarly the unity of political and military command which is so important is personified by him in a way such as has never been known since the days of Frederick the Great.

That no command is free of errors has often been said by the FUHRER himself, moreover the history of war - to use an aphorism of SCHLIEFFEN's - consists in general only of a series of errors and every war situation, naturally, can only be the product of errors.

49 What matters ultimately is contant readiness to act, the determination never to let oneself be beaten and always to stick to the enemy. That it is so now I am able to assure you from the bottom of my heart.

Further, as regards the part played by his collaborators, once again, as before, a quotation from CLAUSEWITZ which is not very generally known has been found true; "The most perfect General Staff with the most correct views and principles does not in itself represent perfect leadership of an Army, if the soul of a great General is missing."

It behoves us all therefore to crush down within ourselves all faint heartedness and by so doing to create within ourselves the foundations of that confidence out of which alone victory can grow. After all, the other fellow is just a bit more frightened still, and a war is only lost when it is given up.

50 How this war will end, that no man can foretell. What imponderables it may yet bring with it, how many hopes may be disappointed and how many troubles may turn to the contrary, lies hidden in the darkness of the future. All that is sure is that we shall never cease to fight, for through the history of the world there run, like an iron law, progress and advance upward. In these Europe has led and at the head of Europe - Germany. A Europe under the whip of American Jews or Bolshevik commissars is unthinkable.

At this hour I would wish to testify not with the lips but from my deepest heart,

- That our trust and faith in the FUHRER is boundless.

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- that for us there is no higher law and no more holy duty than to fight to the last breath for the freedom of our people.

51

- that we will throw off all who are soft and forget their duties.

- that all the threats of our opponents only make us harder and more resolute.

- that we do cherish any false hopes that anyone else might save us from that Bolshevism which will sweep away all should Germany fall.

- that we ourselves will defend the ruins of our country to the last cartridge since it is a thousand times better to live among them than in servitude.

- that we shall win because we must win since otherwise world history would have lost all meaning.

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